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I. INTRODUCTION
As stated, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze The
Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA) and develop a
case study consisting of situations and issues which will
require students of the Organizational Effectiveness Staff
Officers Course to use the principles taught in the Organ-
izational Effectiveness School's curriculum. This case is
unlike any other one currently used by the school in that it
provides situations which instructors from all blocks may
use to emphasize learning objectives relative to their par-
ticular block. There does not currently exist a set of case
studies which provides situations and issues which would
require the students to make an integrated application of
all the curriculum's content towards the attainment of a
solution for a single organization's problems.
The cases in this thesis were prepared by CAPT Nolen V.
Bivens under the supervision of Professors Samuel Parry and
Roger Evered. The cases are intended as a bases for class
discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffec-
tive handling of organizational problems. Certain names
and facts have been changed in order to avoid the disclosure
of confidential information. This does not materially lessen
the value of the cases for educational purposes. The author
requests that the cases only be used in classroom discussions
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS COURSE AND SCHOOL
A. THE OLD PROGRAM
"The old program", to which the writer refers, covers
the period of the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) School's
history from July 1972 (when Fort Ord was the pilot test for
the Organizational Development Program) to June 1983. [Ref. 1]
The purpose of the pilot test was to determine if the
application of Organizational Development (OD) tools could
enhance the effectiveness of Army units. The implementation
of the pilot test accurred in four phases. The most important
result of the pilot test was the establishment of the U. S.
Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (USAOETC)
on 1 July 1975. [Ref. 2]
The OETC ' s mission contained the following objectives:
to train personnel in OE skills for the purpose of assisting
the commander in the accomplishment of his mission, to estab-
lish and maintain liason with the commanders utilizing these
personnel, to develop and evaluate OE techniques, to develop
and refine instrumental survey systems and data processing
requirements, and to support OE Programs. [Ref. 3]
During the 16 week course, the officer was taught various
OE skills. One of the key skills he was given was how to use
the "Four step process." [Ref. 4] The four steps were
assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation. The
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steps essentially described the typical steps an OE officer
would follow once a commander requested his assistance.
A key feature of the OE program during this time was
that it was an all volunteer management tool the commander
had at his disposal to use. In other words, the use of the
OE staff could not be directed by a higher headquarters to
a subordinate unit even if it was suspected that the unit
might have problems with which the OE office could assist
them.
The McBer Consulting Company, as a result of its evalua-
tion of the OE School curriculum, concluded that the OE
School did not place enough emphasis on the "evaluation step"
of the four step process. Another major problem the school
had was gaining acceptance in the Army by all commanders.
[Ref. 6]
Generally, the OE office was operationally assigned to
the Division G-l. As a section of the G-l, it was available
to assist any commander or staff from company level to
division level.
Several changes were made to the OE curriculum during
this time period. Noncommissioned officers began to attend
the course. The school added to the curriculum a block of
instruction in combat related OE. Based on recommendations
from the McBer Consulting Company, instruction on "socio-
technology and job enrichment was also integrated into the
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curriculum. Overall, the school's curriculum was upgraded
to include "state of the art Organizational Development
technology" to insure that the graduating students were
capable of functioning in large organizations with complex
problems. [Ref. 7]
To reflect these changes and many others, the OE staff
officer's name was changed to Organizational Effectiveness
Management Consultant (OEMC)
.
B. THE NEW PROGRAM
The current OE program started in June 19 83. A key con-
cept in the new program is systems integrations. As defined
by the school, systems integration is the "conjoint applica-
tion of behavioral, management, and systems sciences in
achieving unity of effort to meet the challenges posed by
change in the Army." "Structurely" the OE curriculum has been
expanded from 16 to 19 weeks. The graduate of the course is
no longer referred to as an OEMC but as an Organizational
Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESC) . The OESO staff will
only work at division level or higher. It is to be used by
the Division Commander to assist in solving those kinds of
problems which cross over subordinate commands' and staffs'
boundaries. The student criteria has been upgraded to
senior Captain or Major. There will be no NCOs attending
the course in the future.
The OE School envisions that the OE staff work will focus
on such issues as force modernization, systems interfacing,
12
reorganizations, systemic training problems, and information
flow process. [Ref. 8] To meet this operational need the
curriculum now includes major blocks of instructions in How
The Army Runs (HTAR) , the management of networks, analytical
skills, information processing, Air Land Battle, and change
technology. [Ref. 9]
C. THE PROGRAMS IN CONTRAST
The change in focus of the OE school was spurred by a
desire to change the program from a specific orientation on
the individual and his needs to one which puts more emphasis
on the overall organization's needs. It is essentially an
orientation towards systems and systems management. The key
difference is embodied in what the school now calls "systems
integration" as defined earlier.
Recognizing the complex process of change now occurring
throughout the Army, the OE School wants to develop a staff
officer who is capable of understanding and finding solutions
to broad issues which transcend many functional boundaries.
D. THE MOTIVATION FOR THIS CASE
The motivation for designing a single case which reflects,
in an integrated fashion, situations relating to all the cur-
riculum blocks was to provide the student with a method by
which he could apply all the concepts he learns towards solv-
ing an organization's problems. Another reason was simply
because of need. It was also done to allow the student to
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apply the concepts he is learning towards solving issues and
problems similar to those Army commanders are now facing.
E. WHY THE ARMY DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY/HTTB
The choice of- the Army Development and Employment Agency
(ADEA) , formerly known as the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB)
,
as the organization on which to base this case can be largely
attributed to the fact that it is the one organization which
epitomizes the change process the Army is going through.
Secondly, the ADEA organization has a very dynamic mis-
sion which requires it to coordinate with nearly every agency
within the Army, and many outside. Figure 2-1 shows the
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III. THE CASE STRUCTURE
A. GENERAL
First, it must be made clear to the reader that HTTB
was the name of ADEA prior to it becoming a field operating
agency of the Army. So, the term "HTTB/ADEA" refers to the
same organization and only reflects the fact that it had a
name change during the first three years of its existence.
Also, there are actually three cases for this organization.
The case writer uses "the case" as the generic term to refer
to all three cases (HTTB I, HTTB II, and ADEA).
Secondly, it must be made clear as to exactly what "the
organization" is on which the case is based and written.
It is somewhat a misnomer to say that HTTB/ADEA is "the
organization" on which the case was based because of the
unique command relationship which exists between the 9th
Infantry Division and the ADEA organization. The uniqueness
lies in the fact that the commander of the 9th Infantry
Division is also the commander of the ADEA organization.
Because of this fact, it would be more accurate to define
"the organization" on which the case is based as "a composite
of the 9th Infantry Division and the HTTB/ADEA organization"
with more emphasis being placed on the HTTB/ADEA side. In
view of this unique command relationship, writing a case
based singularly on the HTTB/ADEA organization would deny
16
the student some of the true riches which this situation in
the form of a case could offer. Thus, it is from this per-
spective the case has been written.
In view of how "the organization" has been defined, the
case writer recommends that each student thinks of himself
or herself as an OESO assigned to the 9th Infantry Division
when attempting to find solutions to the case. This is a
key point and should be made very clear to the student prior
to his or her reading any of the cases.
The case writer, for the purpose of case development,
has divided the curriculum into the four major areas of sys-
tems science, management science, behavior science and how
the Army runs. Also, in Chapter Five the case writer has
presented teaching notes by sections corresponding to these
four major areas. The computer literacy and probability/sta-
tistics components of the curriculum are treated as sub-areas
of management science.
In essence, the case is a source document which presents
issues and circumstances relevant to each of the four cur-
riculum blocks. The case was designed to become the common
document from which the instructor can draw examples to high-
light teaching points and from which the student can see how
relevant and necessary the knowledge he or she receives is
to solving an organization's problems.
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B. THE CASE STRUCTURE
"The case" captures issues from the genesis of the
ADEA/HTTB organization through the first three years of
growth. Because of the long period over which the case is
written, the best presentation of the organization's history
and issues in case format could be obtained by writing three
separate cases. Each case encompasses one Fiscal Year (FY)
of the organization's existence. HTTB I covers the first,
HTTB II covers the second and ADEA covers the third fiscal
year. Based on the interviews done in the organization and
the research of historical documents, the fiscal years pro-
vided logical break points at which to divide the data for
development into a coherent case.
More specifically, the case writer has attempted to take
from the organization's history incidences and issues which
are applicable to the tasks, conditions and standards as
reflected in the terminal learning objectives in appendix A.
The case development went from "principle to situation. " The
principle was the Terminal Learning Objective (TLO) . The TLO
was then matched with a generic situation from the organiza-
tion. Figure 3.1 describes the case's concept of development,
[Ref. 10]
The case does not attempt to reflect an example for each
of the terminal learning objectives. However, in instances
where the writer thought certain points in the case were
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so indicated in the teaching notes found in Chapter Five
The teaching notes are intended to be the case writer's
method of communicating to the instructors how the issues
in the case relate to their particular blocks of the curric-
ulum. It is expected that the teaching notes would be read
by each instructor prior to the case being given to the
students.
The case writer's computations for the statistical prob-
lems in each case are listed as subsections in Chapter Five's
teaching notes. This is done so that the statistics and
probability instructors may know how the case writer did his
calculations in the event they use slightly different pro-
cedures in making their calculations. The student's valida-
tion of the case writer's calculations will reinforce the
probability and statistics concepts being emphasized in the
curriculum.
C. SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE CASES MAY BE USED
It is recommended that each instructor examine the
teaching notes relating to his or her particular area. Then,
the case of interest should be read. There may be situations
in the case which illustrate material in their areas which
the case writer has not identified in the teaching notes.
This is because the case writer's goal was to design a case
which reflected the needs of the curriculum while keeping it
general enough to allow for expansion in the future.
20
If there is a desire for the students to read all cases
during the period of the course, it is recommended that they
be presented in the order of HTTB I, HTTB II, and ADEA. The
reason for this is because the cases were written in this
order and reading them in this order, when all are to be read
by the student, will provide for a continous revealing of
what went on in the organization over the three years "the
case" covers. However, since each case has been written over
a particular fiscal year of the organization's history, each
can stand alone and be used to span the entire course if
desired.
The case writer recommends that one of these cases, irre-
spective of which, be presented to the students at the
beginning of the course. This will produce a common refer-
ence point from which the instructor may get examples of his
terminal learning objectives. Then, as the student goes
through each block of instruction, he/she will see, through
the organization in the case, how all of the course content
can be applied when solving one organization's problems.
The names and positions of several persons have been
presented in all of the cases. This can allow for role
sheets to be developed and used when the block on interview
skills is taught.
Recognizing that the OE curriculum is a dynamic one, the
case writer has endeavored to make this case as opened
ended as possible. That is why the last of the three cases
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(ADEA) is presented in a manner which requires the student
to take a future perspective when approaching a solution to
the ADEA's organization problems. Giving it this perspec-
tive will support any efforts in the future to survey ADEA
for additional information to emphasize changes or new TLOs
as they are added in the OE School's curriculum. The case
writer encourages such an effort because the ADEA organiza-
tion is a perfect source for the kinds of issues and problems
the Army commanders are and will be facing in the future.
In some instances, it is doing with technology the kinds of
things Army commanders in the present and future will have
to do in order to solve complex and integrated issues.
Therefore, ADEA is of exceptional value to the OE School
as a case study organization. Through it, the school may
demonstrate to students how applicable its concepts and tools,
specifically systems science, management science, behavioral
science, how the Army runs, and computer literacy are to
solving real Army problems.
22
IV. THE CASES
This chapter contains the case in its three part form;
HTTB I, HTTB II, and ADEA. The content of this chapter is
all the material the student needs to be given.
A. THE CASE OF HTTB I
"Pass in review!" As Major Bacon, the organizational
effectiveness staff officer for the 9th Infantry Division,
heard the commander of the U. S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
give this command to the commander of troops during the
division change of command ceremony, he said to himself,
"Major General Frank Simpson is not only assumming command
of the 9th Infantry Division, but also of the High Technology
Test Bed (HTTB) project—one of the Chief of Staff of the
Army's (CSA) hottest concerns."
The HTTB project, now a year old, had been directed by
the CSA after he assessed and found that the ability of the
U.S. Army to quickly deploy and fight in contingency areas
was unfortunately not very good. From his assessment, he
concluded that the U.S. Army had become increasingly mechan-
ized in order to counter the most dangerous threat, that of
the heavily armoured Warsaw Pact Forces in Europe. He
realized that the heavy divisions had great combat power and
mobility, but they could not be quickly deployed to areas
outside of Europe, where equipment had been pre-positioned
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for their use. On the other hand, he felt the Light
Infantry Divisions could be quickly deployed to any con-
tingency area. But, they currently did not have tactical
mobility once they were on the battlefield and their combat
power was relatively modest. To improve the U.S. Army's
power projection capability he directed the development of
a new type of Light Infantry Division. Through using tech-
nology, he wanted this division to have utility in both
contingency areas and in Europe.
The CSA decided that this capability was needed as soon
as possible. However, he knew that if he attempted to design
this new division through the Army's normal acquisition and
procurement process it would take 10 years or more. The CSA
decided that he could design, develop, evaluate, and field a
prototype of this new type of division within five years if
the real user (any infantry division which would potentially
be in the HTLD configuration) and the developer (all the
Army commands, agencies, and activities which get involved
in the fielding of a new system or doctrine) were merged.
To accomplish this, he gave the commander of the 9th
Infantry Division (the real user) the force design mission
to design, develop, test, and make operational within five
years a new High Technology Light Division (HTLD) which
could complete a strategic deployment with all its organic
soldiers and equipment in 1000 C-141 sorties. The evolving
force was to be adequate for the execution of worldwide
24
contingency missions while retaining significant utility on
the European battlefield. To assist the 9ID Commander in the
accomplishment of this mission, the CSA directed the creation
of the HTTB staff (the developer)
.
As the last unit passed the reviewing stand, MAJ Bacon
began the short walk back to his office with only one thing
on his mind—the conversation which he had with GEN Simpson
three days earlier following his initial in brief by the G-l
staff. During that conversation, GEN Simpson made the
following comments:
"MAJ Bacon, prior to my coming out here to assume
command of this division, I had an office call with the
Chief of Staff of the Army. During our conversation,
he made it very clear to me the importance of this High
Technology Test Bed project. He said he would be expec-
ting to receive an in process review on the HTTB staff's
progress towards the design of the HTLD force structure.
He specifically wants to see our proposed organization
of the HTLD. He reminded me that he had requested that
the proposed organizations, when totaled together, not
exceed a 16,000 manning target.
"So, when I arrived, one of the first questions I
asked COL Jack Saul, the Chief of HTTB, was 'How are we
coming along on the operational concept and organiza-
tional structure for the HTLD?' To my surprise, no force
designs for any of the units are complete as of this date.
This to me represents a problem. Since I have used
Organizational Effectiveness in the past, and with good
results, I must add, I want your office to help me sort
out why the HTTB staff has not been able to develop, at
least, a draft of what the O&O concept for the HTLD
should be within the last year. Once that is done, I want
you to help me develop a plan which will allow us to
complete the HTLD ' s design and be ready to brief the CSA
in six months.
"Now I know my calendar will be full the first week,
but I want you to get on it and come see me. I know you
have been in the division some time, and I want to get
your assessment of it, as well as what you may know about
the HTTB staff."
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As MAJ Bacon opened the door to his office, he thought
to himself, "The General was correct about one thing—I have
been in the division for a while." In fact, the current
month of October marked the end of his second year in the
division. What MAJ Bacon knew, and perhaps the General did
not know, was that things were not the same in the division
as they were when he first arrived.
When he joined the 9th Infantry Division it was, what
you may term, a typical U.S. Infantry Division (light) in
terms of it's composition and mission. It had an H Series
TOE and an unclassified mission to be able to fight in an
European scenario. See Figure 4.1 for 9th Infantry Division's
current organizational structure.
The divisional units' ability to prepare for their
mission was impacted on by a requirement to carry out post
and installation support missions. Seasonally unit pre-
paredness was disrupted by such things as ROTC support, Army
Reserve summer training support, post guard support, etc.
But, even in view of all of this, the units were able to
train. Most of the units reflected this in the successful
results they obtained on their annual Army Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) . Two other events which impacted on the unit's
ability to train was the Army's overall Force Modernization
Program, and the Army's effort to reinstitute its old Regi-
mental System. The 9th Infantry Division had two infantry
battalions which were being converted under this Regimental
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System and would be frequently rotating unit assignments
with a battalion in South Korea.
MAJ Bacon knew the problems facing 9ID and HTTB were
interrelated. The interrelationship was due to the fact
that the 9th Infantry Division was required to provide the
soldiers and equipment in order that the HTTB staff could
test any equipment or concepts which they were recommending
for inclusion in the final HTLD design. There were 9ID
commanders who thought the HTTB support was another "impinge-
ment on available training time". Of course, there were
those on the HTTB staff who felt the 9 ID units did not sup-
port their tests requirements enough.
Prior to going to the change of command ceremony, MAJ
Bacon had pulled out the HTTB transition file and some files
of other work he and SFC McClain had done in the division.
As he opened the HTTB file, he remembered that the issue
which was raised the most during the transition was the
"shortage of personnel." The HTTB staff was initially
authorized 38 personnel. The staff's structure was organized
along the lines of the three tactical concepts of combat,
combat support, and combat service support as seen in Fig. 4.2.
Each of the branches were essentially responsible for the
execution of the CSA's mission statement for the general area
specified in their branch title. For example, the combat
development branch had responsibility for designing, devel-
oping, testing, and fielding of the HTLD prototype to all
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the infantry battalions currently found in the 9th Infantry
Division. The concepts division was, in essence, the idea
branch. They assessed the relevance of a new idea which
had a technical, military or conceptual nature. The test
directorate was responsible for the quality assurance of the
test reports prepared by the outside agencies. The HTTB
had the authority to task Army testing agencies within the
acquisition and procurement community to do tests for them
of concepts and equipment. As necessary these tests were
performed by such agencies as OTEA and CDEC utilizing 9ID
troops while satelliting most of the time on 9ID units'
training exercises. The financial management division was
responsible for performing all resource management functions
for the HTTB. The administrative and technical support
branches were support arms to HTTB's efforts. The operations
branch was concerned with such matters as training and phys-
ical fitness for the HTTB staff.
The number of persons in these staff elements ranged from
1 (as in the financial management division) to 8 (as in the
combat support branch) . In some instances Captains had been
doing jobs that Lieutenant Colonels were supposed to be doing.
During the first year, several persons had been added to the
staff temporarily from other divisional/installation units.
At the time MAJ Bacon did the transition for the HTTB staff,
it consisted of about 55 persons—38 more than it's original
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TDA authorized. The staff had made two separate requests
to the Combined Arms Center for more personnel.
The TRADOC Commander had Staff proponency for the HTTB
staff as stated by the CSA when it was created. The TRADOC
Commander had further placed operational control of the
staff in the hands of the Combined Arms Center (CAC)
.
Because the HTLD unit in its final design had to be
deployable in only 1000 C-141 aircraft, an aircraft liason
team representing the Air Command, the Military Airlift
Command and the Intelligence/AWACS Interface was attached
during the first year of its existence for planning purposes.
The staff often sought developments from other countries
which supported a particular concept they were interested in.
This lead to the first Special Projects Officer (SPO) from
New Zealand being assigned during this time period.
The breadth and scope of organizations over which HTTB
had to plan and coordinate cut across many organizational
boundaries within the Army. For example, their effort to
identify, evaluate and recommend to the Department of the
Army (DA) operational concepts, doctrine, and organizational
training requirements required them to coordinate and staff
all efforts through the Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) specifically its service schools. When ideas about
new material requirements were proposed, they had to be
coordinated with the Department of the Army Material Readiness
Command (DARCOM) . To be able to recommend "new technology"
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they often sought "off-the-shelf technology" from industry
—
another point of coordination.
How to deal with the complexity of this staffing/coor-
dination problem was one of the lessons the junior officers
had to learn during the organization's first year. One of
the HTTB branch chiefs during the transition workshop had
said, "The HTTB staff has been asked to speed up the pro-
curement process in order to field a prototype division in
five years. Normally, it would take 10 or more years of
coordinations between TRADOC, DARCOM, and FORSCOM in order
to field the first unit. We are expected to conceptualize
this new HTLD and then bring together what all of these
three agencies and their subordinate agencies have to say
about it as we design, test and field it". The test which
HTTB conducted was controlled through HQ TRADOC to the test
director (CG, 9ID)
.
MAJ Bacon's other source of data about what was going on
in the HTTB came from the pre-workshop interview he and SFC
McClain had done. MAJ Bacon interviewed the following branch
chiefs: combat support, close combat, concepts, and test
management. He and SFC McClain also did two group interviews
of 15 persons each. They asked four questions of all inter-
viewee's: "What are the major strengths of HTTB?, what
should the first change in the HTTB be?, what issues and
concerns should the new chief of HTTB know about?, and what
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questions do you think the new chief should address?" See
Exhibit 1 for all interview notes.
At the time of the transition workshop, the HTTB staff
had completed only 4 major tests of equipment which they
thought may potentially be included in the HTLD's structure.
These HTTB test were conducted during the division's annual
training exercise conducted at the Yakama Firing Center.
The next folder on MAJ Bacon's desk contained notes from
the goals and objectives conference he and SFC McClain had
done for the previous CG. As he opened it, he remembered
that during the conference it was the issue of test support
to HTTB which most of the commanders raised. Attendance at
the conference included the two Assistant Division Commanders
(ADC) , the brigade commanders, the division support commander,
and all of the division separate battalion commanders.
During the conference, the participants were asked to
develop a list of those issues which needed to be reviewed
before the goals and objectives could be addressed adequately.
They were then asked to prioritize them by voting. As he
looked at the list, MAJ Bacon saw that 100% of the commanders
had felt that "clarification of the HTTB goals" was top pri-
ority. See Exhibit 2 for a copy of the conference notes. As
one commander said, "I want to know when do I sacrifice
mission readiness for HTTB test support?"
Yakama is an auxilliary training installation located
about 125 miles south east of Ft. Lewis, WA.
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During a conversation with the division operation's
officer immediately following the conference, MAJ Bacon had
mentioned how the commanders were very much concerned with
the issue of HTTB test support. The division operations
officer (G-3) , LTC Williams, stated he was not surprised.
He was an old operations researcher and had done some compu-
tations which compared selected unit's Army Readiness and
Evaluation Program (ARTEP) results with the number of days
they had spent supporting HTTB test. Those were the next
two pieces of paper which MAJ Bacon held in his hands. The
first was a table of data which showed the relationship
between the number of days a platoon spent supporting HTTB
test and the number of ARTEP tasks it failed. See Table 1
for this data. MAJ Bacon at first thought these two sets of
numbers were unrelated. But the G-3 had shown him that not
only were they related, but how the number of ARTEP missions
a platoon will fail can be determined if the number of days
it spends supporting HTTB test is given.
He determined, using the data in Table 1, that the average
number of days a platoon spent supporting HTTB test was 17.
The average number of missions failed by the platoons was 22.
He had even gone as far to say that he was 95% sure that the
average number of missions which had been failed was between
55 and 65. He had also found that the standard deviation
between the number of days each platoon spent supporting HTTB
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test was 8. The standard deviation between the number of
ARTEP missions each had failed was 11.
The G-3 had also done what he called a linear regression
on the data points (see Fig. 4.3 for the regression analy-
sis) . He derived an equation by which he could compute the
number of ARTEP missions a platoon would fail based on the
number of days it spends supporting HTTB test. He had shown
that as the number of days a platoon spends supporting test
increases, the number of missions failed by the platoon
would also increase. Based on the fact that he knew HTTB
planned to do some 21 tests next summer during the division's
annual field training exercise, he predicted that if a pla-
toon spends 45 days supporting these tests it could expect to
fail 60 ARTEP missions. He felt that it was not unrelistic
for a platoon to spend this amount of time in support of
HTTB tests during this time period. MAJ Bacon was not sure
about the accuracy of all of these calculations. But, he
thought to himself, "If the G-3 is correct, he makes a good
argument for the commanders who are concerned about limiting
the degrading impact which HTTB support has on the quality
of their training time."
The next numerical data on MAJ Bacon's desk consisted of
survey results which were obtained each month when the OE
staff conducted a class on "situational leadership" for the
Primary Noncommissioned Officers Course. They determined
that this would be an excellent method by which to get an
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idea of what the average junior NCO thought about what was
going on in the division. When the HTTB staff first arrived,
they added several new questions to the survey regarding it.
One of the questions which they added related to the issue
of training. The. question asked was, "Has support of HTTB
tests impacted on your squad/section's ability to train?"
The appropriate response was either "Yes" or "No". They had
collected data for 16 classes. See Table 2 for the soldiers
responses to the questions.
Using nonparametric analysis on the data, specifically
a sign test, MAJ Bacon determined, "If the number of junior
NCO's who felt that HTTB support impacts on their squad/sec-
tion's training ability was greater than those who did not."
He concluded with 9 5% confidence that the number of junior
NCO's in the division who felt HTTB test support impacted on
their ability to train was in fact greater than those who
did not.
The last folder on MAJ Bacon's desk contained notes from
the role clarification workshop which had been done for the
division chief of staff and the general staff earlier that
year.
During that workshop several key points had been made by
some of the division staff members. The division personnel
officer (G-l) expressed that "the HTTB * s mission to design a
new light infantry division has created the managerial
requirement for me to insure that the people envisioned to
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be a part of it arrive by the time it is fully activated."
"This", he said, "compounds my staff's work requirements."
The G-l staff was already responsible for planning personnel
requirements associated with the Army's overall force
modernization program due to take effect in six years. The
problem he said was made worse because, "No one in the HTTB
seems to know what this new HTLD is going to look like and
this restricts my ability to begin any type of planning. "
The G-4 stated that "The units are sacrificing the per-
formance of maintenance on their regular TOE equipment in
order to do maintenance on the surrogate test equipment
assigned them. The commanders did not want "to fall on
their face" when it came time for conducting test demonstra-
tions with the surrogate equipment. He reached these conclu-
sions based on the division maintenance team reports. He
felt relatively sure that acts such as these by the units
would show up in the unit's status readiness reports (USR)
.
He did not know how to advise the maintenance battalions in
direct support to these units on how they should prioritize
their work orders when surrogate equipment maintenance con-
flicted with regular jobs. The unit commanders often
requested that the surrogate equipment be worked on instead
of TOE items which were often long overdue for schedule
maintenance.
Along these same lines he said, "The division support
commander has been complaining to me because he feels his
35
maintenance units are not equipped to provide support main-
tenance for these surrogate items such as motorcycles which
are being tested by the light infantry battalions." Because
these issues crossed over many units 1 boundaries, the G-4
did not know what recommendations for improvement to offer
the Assistant Division Commander for support.
The division chief of staff told the general's staff the
problems they faced could be solved if one of the ADC's was
given oversight responsibility for the HTTB transition pro-
cess. He believed that if transition responsibility was
given to one of these individuals, he would have a focal
point through which to resolve the problems without involving
the CG. The deputy chief of staff for post and facility
engineers, COL Mack, made another suggestion along these
lines. He felt that the growing impact which HTTB support
was having on training and the overall process of transi-
tioning the 9th Infantry Division into its new HTLD structure
could be test controlled if each of the ADCs played a role.
He suggested that one ADC be the manager of "the division's
current state" and that the other be designated the manager
of "the transitioning state." The current state manager, as
he saw it, would insure that the division's ongoing combat
readiness was addressed properly as well as any of the other
day to day mission requirements. The ADC in charge of the
transitioning state would insure all efforts regarding the
transitioning of the 9ID into the new HTLD structure were
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properly executed with the big picture in mind. MAJ Bacon
wondered if this would be a good time to offer either of
these two recommendations to the new CG.
As MAJ Bacon closed the last folder on his desk, SFC
McClain entered his office and said, "It's official now sir.
The activation of I Corp Headquarters will occur here in
three months. I guess we need to go see the new general and
find if he would like for us to help plan a smooth integra-
tion of this new headquarters so that it's impact on the
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GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW RESULTS
The following are the comments members of the HTTB staff
made when they were interviewed by the 9ID OE office in
preparation for the HTTB's Chief of staff transition work-
shop as mentioned in the HTTB I case. The notes are pre-
sented in two sections. Section I contains the group
interview results and section II contains the comments the
four branch chiefs made during individual interviews. The
number following each of the group interview responses is
the number of persons who agreed with that particular state-
ment out of a total of 30 persons.
I. GROUP INTERVIEW RESULTS
A. What are the major strengths of the HTTB staff?
1. Recognized license for creativity. (27)
2. A new CG who seems to be realistic about what the
Division and HTTB staff can do. (25)
3. A mission which can have great impact on the U.S.
Army if we do it right the first time. (18)
4. Money to meet mission needs. (2 7)
5. Rapport we enjoy with resource managers at higher
headquarters to include DA Agencies. (25)
6. The importance of the program and the priority it
carries. (17)
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7. Data base support by the Army community is good. (22)
8. We have improved our relations with The Combined Arms
Center (CAC) . (18)
B. The first change in HTTB that should be made is:
1. Appoint a hard working XO with real power to speak
for the Chief HTTB. (27)
2. Establish a formalized procedure to identify OPA
requirements at an early date (1-2 years in advance). (24)
3. Establish a firm requirement for identifying equip-
ment requirements, budgeting for them and coordinating all
procurement actions. (19)
4. Establish a functional MIS. All HTTB personnel must
be current on major actions and understand command's position
and priority actions. (17)
5. Take on no new missions which further drain an already
bleeding organization. (23)
6. Establish a road map. (15)
7. Stop functioning on a day-to-day basis. (27)
8. Start putting the fingers on TRADOC Schools and
Centers who are not supporting us. (20)
C. Issues and concerns which the Chief, HTTB needs to know
about:
1. Personnel staffing—we need the right people to
certain jobs. (23)
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2. Lack of 9ID staff's understanding of what interface
with HTTB means to the Army, the Division and the test
program. (21)
3. Inability of the PPBS system to provide adequate
funding (primarily OPA) . Insufficient lead time for produc-
tion/acquisition of equipment early on. (20)
4. Finalization of the operational test plans in suffi-
cient time to incorporate requirements in the PPBS. (22)
5. Too many bosses (completely out of control). (19)
6. HTTB has been set up for failure. (12)
7. Insufficient sharing of information between
sections. (7)
8. Lack of HTTB assets to help itself (e.g. , word
processor) . (27)
9. TRADOC and MACOM action officers need to improve
coordinations for requirements. (22)
10. Clarification of the internal organization of HTTB
is needed quickest. (23)
11. Equipment procurement procedures are not responsive
to the HTTB effort. This is true at HTTB, CAC, DARCOM,
FORSCOM, and DA. There is no established procedure. (27)
D. Questions the Chief, HTTB should address:
1. What is his mode of conducting daily business? (19)
2. How long will he be with us? (He's number 3 in the
last twelve months) . (27)
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3. How far will we be backed up in turning around "bad"
decisions that impact on our own work? (10)
4. What is our OPA (the next two fiscal years) status
at DA? (26)
5. What is the status of the approval for our TDA? (29)
6. How to improve our joint functions with the 9 ID? (22)
7. Can we have a Division/HTTB weekend? (2 7)
8. How do we get the key players in the Army on the
same sheet of music with us? The MOU needs to be redone and
all action agencies need to know what they are to do in
support of us. (15)
9. What are his professional and personal idiosyncracies
and desires? (13)
II. INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS
A. Close Combat Chief (LTC. Lee)
1. What are the major strengths of the HTTB staff?
a. Quality of personnel at operating level is
outstanding.
b. Visibility and leverage that charter affords
HTTB/9ID in the DOD community provides unparalled oppor-
tunities.
2. What should the first change made in the HTTB be?
a. Make managers at all levels responsible for
products, not reactive actions.
b. Hold meetings no more than once a week versus
daily.
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c. Keep the Generals out of our day-to-day
business.
3. My concerns for the new Chief HTTB are:
a. Establishment of an HTTB management scheme via
Army regulation which applies to ARSTAFF & MACOMS as well
as HTTB.
b. Better use of contractor service to perform
analysis
.
c. Use of computer systems and contractor effort
for algorithm and software development in order to perform
analysis and solve problems not amenable to green suit or
manual solution.
d. Need to establish rational analysis and deci-
sion making procedures, e.g., test only that which needs to
be tested, use CPM/PERT.
4. What is hindering your accomplishment of the mission?
a. Too many "squad leaders". The typical 0-5 man-
ager cannot manage effectively when he receives (and must try
to reconcile) guidance from an 0-6 and three General officers.
However, in fairness to the Colonels and Generals in 9ID/HTTB,
they cannot function much better when they are responding to
two CAC Generals and one at TRADOC and several at HQDA.
5. Questions or issues the Chief, HTTB should answer:




B. Test Management Division Chief (MAJ Evans)
1. What are the major strengths of the HTTB staff?
a. Talented personnel.
2. What should be the first change made within HTTB?
a. Obtain a clear charter of objectives for HTTB.
That is, how are we going to do business. The current MOU
is worthless.
3. My concerns for the new chief, HTTB are:
a. Many areas are one deep in personnel.
b. Lack of written policy. In three months I have
seen several changes in emphasis due to lack of clear firm
guidance. Every time a General speaks, there is a major
change in direction. For example, the measure of effective-
ness (MOE) surfaces after the test is run. Where was the
concern before?
c. I perceive politics being played between General
officers, major commands and major subordinate commands.
Everybody wants the authority and prestige and control but
nobody wants to do the work or have the responsibility.
d. Are we seeking answers to the right questions?
Too much testing is being done in isolation from consideration
of what the HTID configuration is to look like as a whole.
4. What is hindering your accomplishment of the mission?
a. Shortage of MTOE equipment, people, and time
to train.
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b. Shortage of time to evaluate what is to be
done and how.
c. Lead time for finances and equipment grows
while the time of testing is contracted.
5. Questions or issues the Chief, HTTB should answer:
a. Who is driving the train? What one person at
Ft. Lewis can make a decision and have it carried out regard-
ing the HTLD?
b. Is the program too ambitious for the assets
available? Does the shortage in assets affect the kinds of
questions asked? Are answers to the easier questions sought
because the necessary questions are too hard to answer?
c. How to get the HTTB staff and 9 ID staffs to
start pulling together towards a common goal.
C. Combat Support Branch Chief (LTC Lindsey)
1. What are the major strengths of the HTTB staff?
a. Diverse background and quality of personnel
working here.
b. It is working outside the established Army
system and hence is able to cut across established command
links. (A strength being quickly lost through abuse.)
2. What should be the first change made within HTTB?
a. Establish a guiding philosophy on the way HTLD
will fight. This is very important for guiding the type of
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concepts and equipment we actually test. It would be the
ROC of the HTLD which does not currently exist.
3. My concerns for the new Chief, HTTB are:
a. That he is able to pace himself from the
detailed work, achieve an overview and don't become over-
loaded with small and minute by minute reactions.
b. That he is able to wrest control of what is
going on within HTTB back into his office and have the
strength to protect/breakof f comfortable arrangements, i.e.,
he is the fount of our direction as far as we are concerned
not the ADC (0) or the ADC(S) or whoever.
4. What is hindering you in the accomplishment of the
mission?
a. Lack of a statement of what my mission is. It
has never been articulated to me.
b. Resistance to change at USAES.
c. Paucity of support by 9 ID.
5. Questions or issues the Chief, HTTB should answer:
a. How do we integrate the activities in the
place rather than the separate work now going on?
b. Is what we are doing coherent with the overall
philosophy of the HTLD concept?
D. Concept Branch Chief (LTC Jackson)
1. What are HTTB staff's major strengths?
a. Access to the CSA, high visibility and plenty
of money.
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2. What should the first change within the HTTB staff
be?
a. Discontinue daily meetings.
b. Stop functioning on a day-to-day reactive basis.
c. Start putting the finger on the TRADOC Centers
who are not responding to our needs.
3. My concerns for the new Chief, HTTB are:
a. That he will become overwhelmed by conflicts
and out-ranked by Generals.
b. That his time will be eaten up and not allow
him to direct HTTB.
4. What is hindering your accomplishment of the mission?
a. Failure to use past test results to get the
information we need.
5. Questions or issues the Chief HTTB should answer:
a. How do we clarify with higher headquarters the
responsibility and authority of the HTTB, to include CAC




1. HTTB goals: define when HTTB takes priority over
Mission Requirements. (11)
2. Heavy administrative and planning requirements or
MSC staffs. (7)
3. Earlier notification of changes (timeliness). (7)
4. Units' time required by ROTC, Reserve support, Post
guard, and BTMS attendance. (4)
5. What is the CG doing to protect units from VIPs, TATT,
LAAT, IG, etc.? (4)
6. How to implement guidance when there exists personnel
and equipment shortages. (4)
7. Do we need an air assault school? (3)
8. Problems around deployability. (3)
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B. THE CASE OF HTTB II
Two years had passed since the Chief of Staff of the
Army (CSA) had approved the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB)
project. This project's objective was to increase the U.S.
Army's ability to quickly deploy and fight in contingency
areas through the design of a New High Technology Light
(Infantry) Division (HTLD) . The CSA charged the Commander
9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis to design, develop and
evaluate that Division and the HTTB was the staff element
given the Commander, 9ID, to assist in executing this program.
The mission of the Commander 9 ID and the HTTB Staff was
"to develop revolutionary approaches in concepts,
tactics and equipment that would facilitate a new kind
of division; a High Technology Light Division (HTLD)
with the tactical mobility, firepower and survivability
of a heavy division and the airlift and sustainability
requirements of a light division. This HTLD had to be
capable of performing worldwide contingency missions
while retaining significant utility on the European
battlefield.
"
Control of test activities was exercised through HQ TRADOC
to the Test Director (CG, 9ID) . The Test Bed was commanded
by CG, 9 ID, with both TRADOC and FORSCOM elements OPCON. The
CG, TRADOC, had direct tasking authority to 9ID for test
activities, and was to keep the CGs of FORSCOM, DARCOM and
I Corps informed. During the second year TRADOC and DARCOM
provided a Chief; HTTB, and a Chief, Materiel Support Activity
(MSA) , respectively. TRADOC and DARCOM personnel were assigned
to their parent organizations with their duty station at Fort
Lewis, WA.
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Major General Simpson assumed command of the 9th Infantry-
Division and the HTTB Staff Element in October as it began
its second year of existence. When he assumed command, the
immediate task he faced was to complete the design of the
HTLD organization and the operational structure and brief it
to the CSA within six months.
To accomplish this, MG Simpson approved a reorganization
plan for the HTTB which had been submitted by COL Saul, HTTB
Chief of Staff, one month after he assumed command (see
Figure 4.4). The key aspect of this reorganization was the
creation of the Program Manager's position (PM) within the
Force Modernization Division. PM's positions were created
for each type of unit to be designed in the new HTLD.
The HTTB staff organized work group conferences composed
of representatives which they felt played a part in or had
an interest in each HTLD design area. The PMs. were inviting
in persons from such agencies and commands as Headquarters DA,
TRADOC, DARCOM, FORCOM, USAICS, Fort Sill Targeting Activity,
CAC, Litton Data Systems, USA MICOM, Vought Corporation,
USACMLS, USA CDEC, USA INSBD, CECOM, Signal School, Communi-
cations-Electronic Board, ADA Branch, Boeing Corporation,
Roland, and USAES. The Close Combat Branch Chief referred to
these group conferences as being "Mini-ROC's designed to form-
alize many of the needs identified during the design effort.
"
At the completion of these work groups a proposed organ-
ization was formulated and a draft evaluation plan was written
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and presented to the CG. The proposed organizations, when
totaled together, exceeded the CSA's 16,000 manning target
for the HTLD. MG Simpson, in an effort to reduce not only
the personnel but also the deployability requirements for
the proposed HTLD, held a conference during March at the
Alderbrook Inn where the Division leadership developed the
basic force structure proposal for the High Technology Light
Division (HTLD) . Participants at this conference included
the Division Commander, the Assistant Division Commander (ADC)
for Operations and Support, the Chief of Staff, Major Sub-
ordinate Commanders, the Chief of the High Technology Test
Bed and the Special Assistant to the ADC(O). Separate
Battalion Commanders participated in the portions of the
conference that dealt with their particular issues.
They reduced the organization to 15,977 men which were
deployable in 1353 C141 sorties plus 8 C5A sorties. In con-
junction with this effort, the operational concept for the
High Technology Light Division was formulated also.
The HTTB Force Design and operational concept was pre-
sented to the Chief of Staff of the Army in April as scheduled
The CSA was also given factors which effected the design of
the HTLD structure. They were the identification process of
high technology equipment, the availability of the equipment,
and the How-to-Fight effort conducted by the 9th Infantry
Division.
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Following the April presentation to the CSA the proposed
organizational structure was sent to the TRADOC schools to
be analyzed for personnel mix, combat sufficiency and con-
cept issues.
From 29 April to July the TRADOC agencies conducted their
own review of the HTLD which resulted in producing a division
of 17,742 people with a deployability requirement of 1380
sorties. They briefed this organization structure to the
Chief of Staff of the Army in August.
The major effort following the August In Process Review
(IPR) was to still reduce the HTLD down to 16,000 men. Also,
after the August IPR, automated unit reference sheets were
developed so that transition tables of organization and
equipment (TOE) could be formulated. Ten units were identi-
fied to be immediately formulated into modified TOEs. They
were the Light Motorized Infantry Battalion (LMIB) , Light
Attack Battalion (LAB), Assault Gun Battalion (AGB)
,
Scout Co.-,
one Bde . HHC, 3 Forward Support Battalions, an Air Cavalry
Troop, a Ground Cavalry Troop, and the Artillery Target
Acquisition Battery. Transition E-dates were established
for all the units in the HTLD design. These documents served
as the forerunners of all unit TTOEs and eventually MTOEs
which were developed at HQ, FORSCOM in September.
Even though the Chief of Staff of the Army had requested
that he continue to attempt to get the HTLD structure down to
16,000, MG Simpson knew that his definition phase of the HTLD
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design was nearing completion and that the implementation
phase of HTLD's development had begun. "That", he said,
"meant 9ID would be transitioning from its old structure
into the new division for purpose of evaluation." He recog-
nized that while he did this, he must operate within the
envelop of officer-NCO shortages and personnel turnover
which is characteristic throughout the Army. He knew that
while transitioning into this new division, there would be
new units replacing old ones, new equipment entering the
units, and surrogate equipment being used. In addition, the
routine functions of training, ARTEPs, inspections, etc.,
would have to continue. He had to maintain a deployable
operational division throughout the transition phase. He
had once said, "This is the obvious management challenge."
In an effort to meet this challenge and provide structure
to the 9th Infantry Division's transition process he cen-
tralized transition management authority under the Chief of
Staff 9th Infantry Division. He established the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Transition as the primary 9th Division point
of contact for transition actions which were to occur in the
near term time period. He designated the HTTB as the prin-
ciple 9th Division Agency for far term transition activities.
He set up the Transition Steering Committee (TSC) chaired by
the Commanding General. He also established the Transition
Review Committee (TRC) co-chaired by the two Assistant Divi-
sion Commanders. MG Simpson used these staff positions as
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the management structure to direct the implementation of the
9th Infantry Divisions' transition into the HTLD configura-
tion (see Figure 4.5).
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Transition (ACS,T), was
the Chief of Staff's agent for coordinating and managing
the execution of transition actions within HQ, 9th Infantry
Division. The ACS,T was the principal coordinator of the
TRC, and the executive agent of the Transition Steering
Committee.
The High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) was responsible for
coordination of transition related activities with DA,
TRADOC, DARCOM, HQ FORSCOM staff, 9th Infantry Division staff,
and 9th ID subordinate commands.
As the "Far Term" Activities Agency the HTTB had to
establish combat and material development requirements,
assess unit deployability profiles, coordinate development
of training support literature, and other information and
requirements relative to transition of HTLD units. They also
had to coordinate support of evaluation and/or testing of
transitioning units.
The Transition Steering Committee (TSC) was the overall
policy/decision-making body for all transition issues. The
TSC was chaired by the Commanding General and composed of the
two ADCs, the 9th ID Chief of Staff and the Chief, HTTB. The
TSC provided command guidance and strategic direction to the
total transition process. The TSC was considered in permanent
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session and could be called upon to make command decisions
on time sensitive issues. The TSC took action on any issues
which could not be resolved by a session or action of the TRC.
The TRC was composed of a general officer, MSC/Separate
Battalion (Co) Cmdr. Chief HTTB. The Chairman of the TRC was
the Chief of Staff, 9th Division. Formal TRC meetings were
conducted monthly.
The basic job of the TRC was to conduct quarterly IPR's
of selected unit organization issues. The Chief of Staff,
with advice from the ACS,T and other principal staff, and
HTTB were responsible for determining unit reorganization
actions/issues to be briefed at the TRC. Any TRC member
could nominate agenda items through the ACS,T to the Chief
of Staff. Taskings or guidance resulting from the TRC was
to be compiled by the ACS,T for signature by the Chairman and
distributed to the agencies involved.
This management structure which MG Simpson established
to direct the implementation phase of the 9th Infantry
Division's transition to the HTLD configuration had not
worked very well. This became evident during a Transition
Steering Committee meeting where the CG was told that the
Field Artillery Battery which he formally activated a month
ago in November, in accordance with its planned E-date, would
have to be deactivated because the full complement of officers
required had not arrived on scheduled due to a delay in the
personnel system. The problem was further compounded because
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Litton Data System's Surrogate versions of the Lightweight
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (LAFATDS) had
not arrived. The program manager of the Fire Support Branch,
Combat Development Division, of the HTTB Staff and the Litton
Data System's project manager had (because of the need for
slippage in the delivery dates of some spare parts and test
equipment) agreed for the initial LAFATDS to be delivered 3
months beyond November's scheduled E-date. Since this was a
key component in the Battery's new organizational structure,
most of the units proposed training schedule was unable to
be executed. All of these facts together led the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Transition, LTC Matthew, to recommend to
the CG that the recently activated Artillery Battery be
deactivated immediately and converted back to its original
structure and equipment.
MG Simpson gave approval for the deactivation. He immed-
iately closed the meeting with the following remarks:
"To me this action exemplifies the kind of backward
step which we must minimize. When the CSA created this
project he expected the 9th ID and the HTTB Staff to
complete its mission in five years. It's now December.
I've been commanding this outfit for 15 months and this
HTTB project is a little over two years old. By this you
can obviously see that the time clock for our expected
date of completion is ticking away. Such uncoordinated
and uncontrolled actions as these will not allow us to
succeed. The CSA would not look favorably on our efforts
if these are the kind of reasons we give for not getting
the job done. Obviously the management procedures I
approved for controlling the implementation phase of the
transition are not working. I will examine them, and we
will very quickly decide what needs to be done. Once
this is done, I expect each of you to do everything pos-
sible to insure that such an event as this never happens
again. Meeting adjourned."
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After reflecting on the problem which had just occurred,
and re-examining the previously described management pro-
cedures for guiding the implementation phase, MG Simpson felt
that he needed to take a systemic view of the problem. He
decided to use the Organizational Effectiveness Office to
assist him in this effort. MAJ Bacon, the Organizational
Effectiveness Staff Officer, was directed to, within three
days, do an assessment of the situation and come back and let
him know what the Commanders and Staffs thought the problems
were, and the ways they thought these kind of problems could
be eliminated. The CG gave MAJ Bacon his concept on how the
problem needs to be approached.
"The 9ID policy on organizing new units will be based
on a 'total system 1 concept. A Unit or elements of a
unit will not normally be considered organized and there-
fore pass from special staff cognizance, until the 'total
system' is on hand. A total system includes equipment
(component, and tools), ASL/PLL, publications, tech man-
uals, supply manuals, soldiers' manuals, SQT, ARTEP, etc.,
ammunition, training aids, new equipment training, material
fielding teams, military and civilian manpower spaces,
designated PMOS qualified soldiers, fielding and sustaining
funds for new systems, documentation (TOE and MTOE) , and
MCA facilities. I know all unit organization actions do
not have all of these facets, but each one must be assessed
as either ready or nonapplicable components of a 'total
system' . Requirements that are still being developed,
written, under contract or pending procurement or not suf-
ficiently available will normally be designated as require-
ments which render a unit not capable of performing,
training, testing, field exercise, Force Modernization, or
other assigned missions. In such cases unit organization
actions/decisions will be early senior management review.
You can expect the full cooperation from everyone because
I have told them you are going to be working for me on this
in an expeditious manner."
Because of the short time in which he had to respond to
the CG, MAJ Bacon decided to interview only the key persons
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in the current management structure for the transitioning
process. He coordinated and scheduled one hour interviews
with the following persons: the Assistant Division Commander
for Support, the Division Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Transition, the 3rd Brigade Commander, the HTTB
Chief of Staff, and the HTTB Staff Executive Officer. He
asked each of these persons two general questions: What are
some of the reasons for the Division and HTTB Staff not being
able to get the job done?, and/or what do you think could be
done to make the management structure function more effec-
tively and efficiently?
When Major Bacon arrived for his interview with the
Division Chief of Staff, COL West, he found that COL West had
requested LTC Matthew, ACS-T, to sit in with them because in
COL West's words that "would allow him to kill two birds with
one stone." Major Bacon asked the questions he had planned
and after some moments of silence LTC Matthew said,
"What is missing most in this whole transition manage-
ment process is an overall integrated document covering
a unit's transitioning activities. There are a lot of
actions which are required to get a unit prepared to meet
its E-dates. And, at present, those persons responsible
for doing them are all acting individually.
"I've been thinking about this problem for some time
now, and what I've concluded is that we need to establish
a requirement for each unit of 9ID to prepare what I call
a Unit Organization Plan (UOP) . As I envision it, this
plan will be prepared by a team of functional experts hired
by contract to work with each organization to meet the
requirement. By functional experts I mean civilian per-
sonnel who for instance know all the ins and outs of how
to get new personnel with new MOS ' s into a unit organiza-
tion. In a similar way, I see the same kind of person
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from the civilian contractor, who knows the peculiarities
of their business, being a part of the team. I see the
team working under my auspice along with the Transi-
tioning Unit Staff and the HTTB Program Manager in order
to develop and maintain a current unit organization plan.
To be most effective the UPO development will have to be
an interactive staff process conducted on a 60 day cycle.
"Such a document can very easily become the basis for
preparing supporting management documents such as request
for training publications and development of the personnel
distribution plan (PDP) . Currently the key/central manage-
ment document is the unit's milestone schedule. Its
weakness is like all milestone schedules and that is it is
only a 'checklist' for events without an ounce of 'planning',
The UOP would be the document which has the 'planning'
incorporated in it. Under this plan I have in mind, the
milestone schedule would not be deleted, but only serve as
a supporting document. And, because of its importance, the
milestone schedule would be updated bi-weekly versus once
a month as it currently is.
"If adopted, the UPO would become that document which
integrates the actions of the two key elements in this
transition's implementation phase, the HTTB Staff and the
particular Division unit being transitioned into the new
HTLD configuration. Under my plan the commanders would not
be concerned, as they are now, with simply defining require-
ments related to new or displaced units, but they would
assist in the development of the UOP and would approve each
iteration before the UOP is forwarded to the 9ID Staff for
analysis. The HTTB Staff would in conjunction with the
Transitioning Unit Commander, assist in preparation and
staffing of the UOP. The UOP development process will only
be complete when the responsible Major Subordinate Commander
(MSC) /Separate Battalion Commander has briefed and been
granted TRC approval to terminate the process. Overall,
the UOP provides a guide for planning, checking completeness
of actions required, assisting Headquarters 9ID in identi-
fying issues and insuring that the quote total system unit
organization in the 9th Infantry Division occurs."
At that moment Major Bacon asked, "Sir, how will this UOP ben-
efit the division special and primary staffs? LTC Matthew
continued by saying,
"As I see it, the primary concerns of the Division
Staff in this transitioning process are to monitor emerging
unit organization requirements and associated milestones
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from the point of view of supportability and issues
avoidance. To date they have tailored their efforts
to the milestone plan. This, by virtue of the fact
that the milestone schedule was based on essentially
no planning, made whatever actions they took potentially
vulnerable to Murphy's Laws. The staff needs to monitor
emerging unit organization requirements with a sense of
active anticipation for what requirements that creates
for them. Once such requirements are identified, they
need to be incorporated in the UOP. That's how the UOP
helps them. They are able to give input and analyze
the unit's organization plan and get involved early on.
This has not happened in the past and in my opinion, is
one of the two key reasons for the deactivation of the
Artillery Battery.
"You see, each of the general or special staffs have
oversight for specific areas a unit attempting to trans-
ition by its established E-date must consider. Each of
these areas, even if the best of planning is done, have
the potential for key events to fall through the crack.
This is evident to me because of the things which failed
to occur in many of the staff areas and fostered the
deactivation of the Artillery Unit.
"For example, the Division Logistics Officer (G-4) did
not examine the facts and assumptions the unit followed
when it did its planning. At a minimum his staff should
have examined them for logistical personnel, ammunition,
repair parts (ASL/PLL) , special tools, equipment transfer/
turn-in, and indirect requirements such as base operations
in terms of personnel and facilities. ^s a result the
unit logistic officer asked "How do we get additional
storage requirements for the new equipment?" and "What are
the procedures for turn-in of excess items?" Such ques-
tions and problems as these should be addressed and
solutions sought well in advance. Requiring the G-,4 through
the UOP to evaluate and analyze initial logistic assump-
tions would reduce the potential of errors in the area of
maintenance.
"One other thing we learned is that the Adjuntant
General needs to determine long lead time SC/PMOS require-
ments and demands for MOSC that have not been developed.
The personnel requirements have to be top loaded or fed in
PERSACS. If this is not done, corrective action must be
coordinated with Forces Command (FORSCOM) . Prior to acti-
vation of the unit, the AG had not published a 9ID dis-
tribution plan (PDP) which reflected the organization
requirements. The need for this became evident when the AG
staff found that some of the Artillery Units to be tested
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would require SC/PMOS which were shortages. Also, many
of the soldiers required by this unit were not planned
for so as to arrive with the necessary training before
the unit's MTOE "E" date.
"One of my big problems personally has been to get
the Comptroller involved in providing technical assis-
tance in the analysis and costing for new organizations.
I had been attempting, to no avail, to convince him that
the CG wanted the transition funding requirements to be
integrated with the Force Modernization Funding where
applicable. The other day he told me the CG had asked
him if we had saved any money by doing this in view of the
funds expended towards the activation and sudden deacti-
vation of the Field Artillery Battery. Also, had the
Division Intellegence Staff assessed whether the new unit
would need any additional REDTRAIN or OPFOR support equip-
ment, they would have discovered that the Lightweight
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (LAFATDS)
does need additional funding so as to develop OPFOR or
REDTRAIN devices in order to test the unit's effective use
of it. The Comptroller would have had to insure that the
fund requirement was submitted to the I Corp Comptroller
for inclusion in his AFCO submission to FORSCOM. Had
they been required to analyze the Unit's Organization Plan
for such support they perhaps could have identified and
responded to these requirements.
"The Assistant Division Engineer serves as a unique
example of how the UOP would be beneficial to the Division
Staff elements. We knew for a long time that the guns the
Artillery units would be getting were much larger and would
require a much larger motor pool parking space. Their
failure to coordinate development of installation MCA pro-
grams to support new Unit Organization Requirements is ex-
hibited by the fact that the Field Artillery Batteries have
no place to park their large guns now which is closed in
and secure. Had the Assistant Division Engineer been a
part of the UOP planning process and analyzed it for poten-
tial engineer requirements, we would at least known when
this unit's parking spaces will be hard surfaced and
enclosed with fencing.
"The Division Operations Officer's (G-3) Staff can also
benefit by being involved in this development of the Unit
Organization Plan. Their failure to review the unit's pro-
posed training schedule allowed the unit not to include
some of the training requirements the CG specifically wants
transitioning units to stay on such as individual SQT skills
and ARTEP tasks. If the unit submitted its proposed master
training schedule as a part of the UOP and the G-3 Staff
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analyze it for congruence with the CG's objectives then
these kind of unacceptable training schedules would not
be prepared.
"The Division Personnel Officer also can benefit by
being part of this analysis effort of the Unit's Organ-
ization Plan. If the G-l Staff had reviewed the organ-
izations personnel requirements to see if they were
supportable from an officer personnel standpoint then
we would have known that the required officers would not
be able to arrive by the scheduled E-date for the
Artillery Unit.
"In terms of one last point, my experience in this
job for twelve months now has shown me that even if
everyone did exactly what he was supposed to do—the
problem would not go away. The key management challenge
here is the fact that all of the actions are interrelated.
A slip in the date the equipment will arrive will effect
the personnel, who, if they arrive as scheduled, will not
have anything to do. And, if the equipment arrives but
proper maintenance facilities are not available, you have
new equipment being damaged or potentially stolen.
"
Major Bacon asked if there were any more comments either
one of them would like to make. The Chief then said,
"Even though I agree with all the LTC Matthew has
said, I would like to say one thing in defense of the
Division Staff. These staff elements of mine are not only
having to consider the transition effort but they must
also continue to provide support to all the other Division
Units. The G-3 needs to insure all units have ARTEPs
scheduled, resources available to support them, and time
to train. The G—4 has to insure all the normal logistics
for a Division like this are executed. And most import-
antly the G-l, for example, must insure that the soldier
is not forgotten about and taken care of through all of
this.
"This last point was brought to my mind this morning
because of a paper I received from the G-l. You are aware
that this Division's immediate higher Headquarters, I Corp,
was activated here. With the arrival of I Corp came other
impacts. This paper examplifies one of them."
Major Bacon asked, "What is it?" The Chief of Staff then
said,
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"When Corp arrived an additional demand was placed
on the already limited number of quarters available to
all ranks. The result has been that more soldiers have
been forced to move out into the civilian community to
seek housing. With our pay, as stated by the President,
'5% behind the civilian sector', the Corp Commander was
worried that many of our lower enlisted would be living
in inadequate housing. He charged the Corp G-5 to examine
this issue. Apparently the Corp G-5 took a random survey
of 220 military families living in the civilian community
and checked to see what the status of living was like for
them. These two pieces of paper summarize what he found.
This first table (Table 3) shows by rank the number of
military persons surveyed, their annual salaries to
include BAQ, the number years of service, and monthly BAQ
rate for each. He has defined 12 different family types.
For example, an E-4 with 2 years service whose monthly
BAQ rate is $216.00 and annual income is $10,212 is one
of the total 25 families who make up Family Type 4.
"This next table (Table 4) is a matrix presentation of
Military Wage Earner salary (MW.)# Dependent Wage Earner
salary (DW. ) , the number of children in each family
type (C f .)/ the total numbers by families by family type
(Nfi ).
l
"Yet this next table is the key one (Table 5) for on
on it you see where the Corp G-5 took the data from the
previous tables and did some simple calculations and
shows that 'our Military Wage Earners are o.k. and exper-
ience no significant hardships'. However, the Division
G-l took the same day and has shown through his statis-
tical calculations that our Military Families living off
post are not doing well and predicts that things will get
worse if our 5% raise is not approved and more personnel
are forced to live off post due to shortage of quarters.
"At present I'm unsure what to do with this information,
I'm sure the G-l has not lied and he assures me that the
Corp G-5's calculations are correct, but that he made the
wrong interpretation of the data. Even though these two
seem to contradict each other, the point that came to my
mind from this is that we must not forget our soldier
during all of this transitioning process."
Those comments concluded MAJ Bacon's interview with COL
West and LTC Matthew. In five minutes he was to interview
BG Harris, the Assistant Division Commander for support and
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co-chairman of the Transition Review Committee.
After reporting in and asking the questions he planned,
GEN Harris made the following comments:
"An organization structure is effective if it assists
individuals in the attainment of organizational objec-
tives, and if its structure aids the accomplishment of
organizational objectives with a minimum of unsought con-
sequences or costs. In our case, the HTTB is the TDA
organization attached to 9th ID to program manage in
detail the myriad of components for transition such as
new equipment, tactics and doctrine, etc. The ACofS,
Transition was created as a separate special staff agency
by the CG—a formal communications and coordination mech-
anism between the 9th ID and HTTB. The ACofS Transition
Charter is to be an all source clearing house for transi-
tion issues between HQ DA, FORSCOM, 9th ID staff, HTTB,
subordinate units. The execution of our Transition plan
is done along traditional command lines of responsibility.
The problem with all of this from the top to the bottom
is that DA MACOMs are not organized to handle 'jamming' a
new Division through their resourcing systems; the HTTB
and G Staff are required to do traditional business in a
nontraditional manner in order to get the job done. This
effect cascades down to the lowest unit level; informal
chains of decision and action often supercede the formal;
and 9th ID/HTTB staffs receive conflicting or uncoordinated
guidance from DA/FORSCOM/DARCOM/etc. Guidance is communi-
cated to transitioning units through numerous channels
such as Cmd, HTTB (PM) and Staff. Commanders and staff
spend a lot of time sorting out where the 'truth' lies.
"Staffing has been a source of problems for us during
the management of this transition process. By and large,
the CG has had tremendous success in being able to staff
'high leverage' positions with people of his choosing. He
has created his 'top team' based on personal knowledge of
the key players. But the high annual turnover rates of
NCOs (30-40%) has had a tremendous adverse effect on unit's
ability to plan and execute. Normal officer and NCO on-
post PD job rotations add to the confusion. As one
commander told me he 'can't tell today's players without a
scorecard'
.
"Another area of contention for us has been in the con-
trol of the process. It's true a Committee System of
Transitioning Management has been established. TSC sets
the charter. TRC provides Commanders and Staff with mech-
anism to force action up or down. The Transition War Room
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is designed as a TOC where vertical and horizontal com-
munications mechanism within the Division can continuously
occur. The HTTB PMs continually monitor the progress of
their areas of responsibility providing input to CG
through Chief HTTB. However, we need accurate Quantita-
tive Analysis plans and Quality Control mechanisms to
detect actual or potential deviation from plans. In our
environment external agencies (out of our span of control)
are able to adversely impact on transition activity
—
forcing 9th ID to 'scramble-alert' informal backup systems
to change the formal system. Further, 9th ID does not
control the resourcing agencies that will ultimately
determine the HTLD's fate. We try to influence the
bureaucracy but major battles are won or lost by playing
a limited quantity of trump cards.
"Somehow I think our planning needs to be done better.
We have diverse planning functions (Acquisition and Pro-
curement) conducted by staff elements under traditional
areas of authority. For example, training by G-3, person-
nel by G-l/AG and equipment by the G-4. A good aspect
about our process is thoughts that the HTTB provides new
equipment fielding plans to ACofS Transition and the ACofS
Transition overlays the developed plans to identify actual
and potential disconnects between Force Modernization,
Training, Restationing, and Personnel. The ACofS Transi-
tion also maintains the HTLD milestone calendar, Training
1 Horseblanket
'
, Transition Schedule, and the New Equipment
Fielding Schedule. This good quality of our planning is
so often overshadowed because the 'Full Plate* of the
normal unit training activities required to maintain combat
readiness is heavily impacted on by adding additional
helpings of transition activities. Units and Staffs become
'event' driven. Commanders have little or no flexibility
in their training plan due to 'full plate' effect. They
lose their ability for reinforcement or corrective train-
ing. They are working overtime just to accomplish the
routine.
"We've learned that the Transition Schedule is fluid
and dynamic because transition dates are tied to equipment
delivery schedules which are not firm. The Field Artillery
LAFTADS, the assault gun, and the HMMV are examples of how
this can go wrong. Slippages in one dimension will continue
to cause a 'domino' effect in the others.
"In spite of the fact that the CG and subordinate Com-
manders have taken great effort to clearly communicate
the importance of the transition effort, it is very dif-
ficult for a unit that is consistantly jerked at the end
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of the 'transition' string to understand the 'big picture'
concept. More importantly it is extremely difficult for
soldiers to understand what is going on (big picture) in
this volatile environment. In this division leadership
is burdened with a double dose administrative workload.
The leadership is taxed to the maximum to keep unit morale
and espirit at a pitch.
"One thing I think we must keep aware of is that we
do not let this process overwhelm our people. To get the
job done we've had to remove some of the traditional
structures in order to respond to the changing rules of
the game. I've observed that this has placed many outside
their 'comfort zone' in the way we do business."
This was the last interview Major Bacon had scheduled
for the first day. He went back to his office to analyze
the information he had received the CG's concept of how the
problem should be approached.
The next day he interviewed the Chief HTTB, COL Saul, and
LTC Smith, XO HTTB, and COL Chapman, the 3rd Brigade Comman-
der. During his interview COL Saul made the following remarks:
"I am glad that the General has gotten your Staff
involved in this. Not long after I took over 17 months
ago in the Month of August, it became clear to me that
not everyone understood the enormity of this mission the
HTTB Staff and the 9th Infantry Division had been given.
My staff at that time was still trying to just design the
units which would eventually compose the HTLD. As you
know, HTTB evaluates emerging operational and organiza-
tional concepts under the auspices of CG, 9ID. In addition,
HTTB facilitates 'near term' enhancements which comprise
the expedited 9ID assimilation of current production items
and product improvements that use materiel fielding plans
as their primary introduction documentation. Additionally,
HTTB is used as a medium to evaluate emerging operational,
organizational and materiel concepts to enhance mobility,
firepower, C 3 and deployment of the light division.
Learning all of what this mission entails is essential if
such incidence as the one with the Field Artillery Battery
deactivation is not to occur again.
"HTTB is now resourced to do what was apparent yesterday,
but still struggling with what has to be done tomorrow to
make operational the envisioned capabilities of the key
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fighting echelons of the HTLD. In essence what happens
is that in the process of doing what we know has to be
done we have revealed to us something else just as impor-
tant which has to be done. Let me give you an example of
this.
"The HTTB Staff had gone out and actually done tests
on several concepts and equipment items and selected them
as being viable for inclusion in the HTLD design before it
realized that it had no formalized way to make this require-
ment known to the acquisition and procurement community.
So last year, around the time I arrived, we established the
Quick Reaction Package (QRP) program. Under this program,
after equipment needs for the fielding of the HTLD are
identified, in order to initiate research, development and
acquisition of this equipment, the HTTB PMs pass the QRP
(need statements) to TRADOC and DARCOM for their input.
The QRPs are then passed to DA for approval and funding.
However, depending on the item or concept many other Army
Agencies can become involved in the review. For example,
if it's a new kind of missile system, the USA Missile
Command gets involved, and things can be stopped or slowed
down anywhere along the way. The QRP is in essence a Mini
ROC or equivalent to the mission essential needs statement
which proceeds our normal development process."
"Is this what happened to the Field Artillery LAFTADS
System?" asked Major Bacon.
"In a way, yes. But the whole story around the Field
Artillery Battery illuminates some of the kinds of problems
we face when doing our business. Let me tell you about it.
"First of all, from October of last year to September
this year the Fire Support Branch was a one man operation.
During October of last year there were several ongoing
actions concerning the Division Artillery for the HTLD which
primarily oriented toward equipment and deployability. One
driving concern from the Command Group and DIVARTY was cen-
tered on the MLRS and M198. This was primarily generated
around the weight of the two systems. During this period of
time the HTLD DIVARTY was structured almost identically the
same as a light division unit in the Army's Force Moderniza-
tion Plan. The only unique organization was the DTAB.
Also, issues concerning how to fight concepts were being
analyzed
.
"During November primary actions involved preparation
for work group conferences on the HTLD. Actions regarding a
lightweight (LT.WT.) replacement for MLRS were surfaced
during the month.
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"During December the first QRP was prepared for the
HTLD by the Fire Support Branch. The requirement was
written for a Lightweight Howitzer and was the first of
several that followed later.
"During January the first briefing was given to the
CG concerning the transition of the DTAB. Litton Data
Systems submitted an unsolicited proposal to satisfy the
9th Division needs as stated by the QRP document for a
Lightweight Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(LAFATDS). The first Mini ROC (QRP) conference was hosted
by CAC at Fort Lewis to discuss and revise the Phase I
series of QRPs. Representatives from DCD Fort Sill, CAC,
DARCOM, and FORCOM were present. Three QRPs were concep-
tually approved and forwarded to CAC after the conference.
They were LT.WT. DS Weapons System, LT.WT. Field Artillery
Tactical Data System and the LT.WT. MLRS. The first IPR
to the CG 9th Division was in January. The first CPM was
prepared by the Fire Spt Br and given to the Deputy Chief
FDD.
"During February a Fire Spt working group was held at
Ft. Lewis to develop the HTLD organizational structure and
prepare the master evaluation plan. Litton Data Systems
briefed their proposal for the LT.WT. AFATDS to MG Simpson.
Vought Corp visited Ft. Lewis and presented their varients
to meet the requirements for the 9th Division's LT. WT.
MLRS
.
"As you know during March the Division's 0-6 seminar
on the HTLD structure was held at the Alderbrook Inn. Dur-
ing the seminar, everything which was accomplished during
the February work group was ignored and several other pro-
posed organizations were surfaced. The CG did not like any
due to the excessive number of C-141B sorties required.
The alternative structures were scrubbed and re-presented to
CG on 11 March. While the FA Branch Chief was on leave in
late March, a decision was made by the CG that the DIVARTY
HTLD structure would consist of 3 DS Artillery Battalions
structured as composite units (2x8 M19 8 and 1x6 MLRS)
.
There would be no GS Battalion. The TAB would become a
battalion size organization. This would be the organiza-
tion presented to the CSA for approval and follow on
analysis. Late in March representatives from Lockheed
Corporation and the project managers office for RPV Acquila
met with the Fire Spt Branch at Ft. Lewis to discuss the
use of an RPV with the DTAB evaluation in October.
"During April primary emphasis was centered on the HTLD
equipment transition listings. Members from Telos Corpora-
tion visited and were given an HTLD Data Systems overview.
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Meetings were held with representatives from the USMC
Developments Firepower branch to discuss mutual equipment
needs and possible joint efforts. An overnight working
session was held at Yakima to prioritize items for the
five years of the PARR and establish a transition listing
for HTLD. People don't seem to get the budgeting process.
This action is still ongoing.
"During May an FTX took place at the Yakima Firing
Center. Representatives from the office of Secretary of
Defense were at Ft. Lewis to discuss funding and review
items needed by HTLD to determine what support they could
give in acquisition. May was the test period at YFC. Also,
a meeting took place at Dallas, TX concerning the LT.WT.
MLRS and variants to meet the requirements.
"During June a meeting was held at Ft. Lewis with rep-
resentatives from CAC, TRADOC, USAFAS, DA, and DARCOM to
finalize the QRP documents. One QRP from the fire support
branch was rewritten, the LAFATDS requirement. The QRP was
written initially to replace in total TACFIRE. Due to
political opposition from USAFAS and PM LAFATDS the QRP was
written again so that it would not oppose the ongoing AFATDS
project. The 9th ID QRP was changed to reflect an interm
solution with TACFIRE as the objective system.
"During July the main concern was centered on issues
that had been surfaced concerning the HTLD structures.
These issues were generated from CAC and TRADOC schools.
Part of the Artillery issues were answered by a fire power
analysis that was done by Fort Sill which favorably compared
the HTLD DIVARITY with a unit in the Force Modernization
Plan. All of this was done in preparation for the CSA IPR
in August. Vought Corp and PM MLRS representative briefed
the CG on their LT MLRS alternatives. The CG prepared the
M667 and M548 varients but refrained from selecting one of
these two until the CH47D lift analysis was further refined.
"The CSA IPR took place on 5 August 19 82. Some addi-
tional actions were generated from the IPR but in general
everything was favorable. The DTAB structure and transition
issues continued to be refined during the month. Primary
problems centered on a workable 0&0 concept. Unit top load-
ing for TTOEs began during August. Manuever units were to
be loaded first, others to follow. On 12 August, Litton
Data Systems briefed MG Simpson on their revised proposal to
meet the 9 ID LAFATDS QRP. The proposal was looked upon
favorably but there was still much political opposition to
overcome. Magnavox Corporation presented briefings and dem-
onstrated their data systems. Several demonstrations were
given and most of the concerned division elements were rep-
resented.
73
"In September, a meeting was held at HQ DARCOM to
discuss the AFATDS QRP and how to meet the requirements.
Representatives from PM AFATDS CAC, TRADOC, USAFAS, and
DA were in attendance. No decisions were made but sev-
eral alternatives were raised.
"It was during August that we began to set E-dates
following the CSA provisional approval of the units and
their compositions. The Artillery Battery was one of these
units. Operating under the assumption that the LAFATDS QRP
would be approved we felt the E-date was realistic.
"What I've told you is those actions we took to insure
the Field Artillery was ready for activation. It's impor-
tant to recognize that in order for this Battery to be
ready for activation each of the division general staffs,
and DIVARITY itself should have been taking specific actions
during this same time period. You know the results, it was
activated in November and deactivated 3 weeks ago, 2 months
later.
"What we have afloat is a process where several staffs,
HTTB, 9 ID General Staff, and the unit staffs are performing
a multitude of individual actions. Even though the Assis-
tant Chief of Staff for Transition is supposed to be that
integrating link, he is constrained because the staff
assisting him is only 3 deep, himself, a 1st Lieutenant,
and a Master Sergeant. There is not enough knowledge there
about how the Army runs to identify potential problems and
cut them off ahead of time. So you see, the solution to
9ID/HTTB's and now I must include I Corp, problems can not
simply be to re-examine our procedures for the implementa-
tion phase to this transition process. The 9 ID community
must come to realize that together we have been given a
mission to do which in requirement mimicks the Army's entire
acquisition and procurement process. This is no simple
task. It requires a multitude of coordinations with agen-
cies throughout the Army and the Civilian Community."
Those comments concluded Major Bacon's interview with
COL Saul. He then went to interview the HTTB Executive Offi-
cer LTC Smith. Major Bacon asked his planned questions and
LTC Smith gave the following comments:
"The greatest single problem has been the very nature
of the work and complexity of the processes contrasted with
the limited time and manpower resources available. The
HTTB is accelerating the force development process involv-
ing~"three major commands, HQDA, OSD, the Congress, and
civilian industry. An average of three General Officers (or
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equivalent) visitors per week is hosted by HTTB and while
this facilitates coordination in terms of a wider under-
standing of the HTLD, it does diminish the time available
for productive work. HTTB is examining every functional
aspect of the HTLD division and equipment ranging from
off-the-shelf items to those in exploratory development.
The necessity for fielding a prototype divison in five years
adds a time urgency to everything that is done. Through
the HTTB TDA has nearly doubled, the work expanded consid-
erably in volume, complexity and urgency and the few staff
officers, mostly relatively junior and unexperienced, had
a difficult time in coping with this stimulating, but dif-
ficult, work environment.
"Special Project Officers (SPOs) are hindered in per-
forming their respective projects due to their limited
access to classified and unclassified U.S. documents based
on AR 380-2 5. To complicate matters further, the SPOs
cannot attend conferences and briefings at Fort Lewis, and
throughout the Army community, without the express consent
of TRADOC Disclosures Branch. Once TRADOC approves a visit
by a SPO to attend a conference or meeting, the SPO must be
escorted by a U.S. Officer of equal rank to the SPO. Cur-
rently, TRADOC and HQDA are working to resolve the problems
with the SPOs.
"In the process of trying to do all of this, we as an
organization have been dealing with a lot of the typical
management problems. For example, in August of last year
the Deputy, FDD, was replaced by a New Zealand officer, MAJ
Neil Bradley, who had been acting as program manager for the
Engineer Battalion throughout the summer. FDD received
liaison officers from the Field Artillery School, the Air
Force, the Log Center, the Infantry School, and from the
Soldiers Support Center.
"Some of our significant problems in regards to fielding
of the HTLD are: resolving the issue of systems integration
for all vehicles such as the Light Motorized Scout Vehicle,
the Assault Gun, and the Fast Attack Vehicle; assessing the
survivability for individual crews, and equipment against
ballistics and environmental threats; and a sense of cooper-
ation and teamwork between all involved still needs to be
improved upon as major evaluations, and follow-on transition
to the HTLD occur.
"As you perhaps know one of our tasks is to assess new
ideas of a technical, military or conceptual nature for
implementation in the HTLD. The assessment of new ideas has
necessitated a search for appropriate methods of simulation.
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At this time this search has not resulted in our selection
beyond the possible use of the CORDIVEM model being devel-
oped as part of the Army Model Improvement Program (AMIP)
.
We could use a lot of help in this area. Starting in
February, TMD received its first installment of word pro-
cessing equipment. This equipment was updated and replaced
during the summer months with state-of-the-art word pro-
cessing equipment. Continuation of this updating/replace-
ment program is scheduled for first of next year.
"Perhaps the area that has internally given us the most
trouble is around our Financial Management Division (FMD)
It's not so much the FMD itself as it is getting all the
Divisions to understand how to play the Army's money game.
During our second year of existance the approved operating
budget increased 171%. That is from $6.8 million to $18.4
million. The work load to manage this increased in direct
proportions to the available funding. Coordination meet-
ings, liaison visits and TDY trips also increased. These
visits, meeting conferences and workshops were necessary to
establish the framework for determining the total funding
resources for both testing and fielding the HTLD. Through
months of anguish, frustration and agony, we were able to
develop and formulate a cohesive and comprehensive funding
program to achieve the mission objectives of the HTLD as
directed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. A problem we are
still addressing centers around the lack of personnel to
adquately maintain required resource documents and data
concerning HTTB test efforts.
"As the Test Bed grew in size, many of the individuals
who helped lay the initial cornerstones for the organiza-
tion were being reassigned. Their departures presented a
void in the ongoing developments of institutionalizing the
Test Bed as a viable test activity within the TRADOC Test
Community. Newcomers brought with them new ideas and con-
cepts. They also brought the need for increased financial
awareness and funding flexibility. Our higher command was
initially reluctant to grant the funding flexibility re-
quired to insure test objectives were met. And without
flexibility, innovations were curtailed.
"The activation of I Corps Headquarters presented the
requirement for the FMD to further coordinate its actions
and efforts. Though the coordination was telephonic in
many instances, a pause in normal operations occurred.
Further, what was considered business as usual in dealing
with other activities of the 9th Infantry Division and Fort
Lewis proper, was now elevated one echelon above. We have
not only liaison with the 9th Infantry Comptroller but coor-
dination with I Corps and Fort Lewis activities such as
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Post Comptroller, Directorate of Industerial Operations
and Directorate of Facilities Engineers, to name a few.
"It would be proper for me to mention what I think
some of our significant achievements have been. The shape
and form of the prototype organizations is clear. Test
plans, evaluation plans, resources, training and doctrinal
needs have been developed or needs identified. At the
action officer level, there is a commonly understood sense
of purpose and desired objectives. A solid foundation is
in place for progress and achievement toward the HTLD in
our third year."
That concluded Major Bacon's interview with LTC Smith.
He next interviewed COL Chapman, Commander of the 3rd Infantry
Brigade—the one divisional unit which was being tested in the
HTLD configuration. Most of his units supported all the tests
and were being converted as prototypes for the HTLD using
surrogate equipment. When he was interviewed he made the
following comments in regards to Major Bacon's questions:
"What I think we need most is a Transition Working
Group (TWG) . The formation of a Transition Working Group
of action officers from the Division Staff, Transitioning
Units, and HTTB which would meet bi-weekly in the Transi-
tion War Room to identify/resolve unit specific issues
without total TRC involvement, except for final informa-
tion/decision briefings, is critically needed. We need a
Forum for low level issue resolutions that cuts across
lines of staff interest.
"We already have in place the Management Structure to
support this idea. The Chairman of the TWG could be the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Transition. The meetings
would follow an established, timed agenda. Both HTTB, Unit
representatives, and 9th ID Staff POCs would be allocated
time on the agenda to present issues for resolution/dis-
cussion.
"The TWG would address unit organization of units with
E-dates that fall in the next 270 day window. The purpose
of TWG, in essence, would be early identification and reso-
lution of issues at the lowest action level possible. When
issues exceed TWG authority, I would expect them to be
carried forward to a special or monthly TRC meeting for
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decision. The CG, since the FA Battery deactivation
, has
been speaking about a total systems unit organization
process. This addition to our current Management Struc-
ture for Transitioning would allow this to occur more
efficiently.
"
At the moment of those words the interview with COL
Chapman was terminated because he received a call from the
CG's office with the message that he wanted to see him as
soon as possible. Major Bacon returned to his office to
further analyze the information he had received. He had
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Military Years Monthly Yearly
Head of of BAQ Salary
Household Service Rate + BAQ
E-l 2 $ 189.00 $ 8,604.00
E-2 2 189.00 9,324.00
E-3 2 189.00 9,600.00
E-4 2 216.00 10,212.00
E-5 2 246.00 10,888.00
E-6 4 268.00 13,908.00
E-7 2 291.00 13,944.00
E-8 8 313.00 18,732.00
W-l 2 290.00 13,908.00
0-1 2 257.00 14,760.00
0-5 16 448.80 36,156.00
0-6 26 493.50 48,468.00
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Table IV
Military Family Household Income Matrix












$ 8,604 9 ,324 9,600 10,212 10,888 13,908
DW.
l
$ — — 10,000 10,000 —
C
fi
4 1 4 6
N
fi
3 20 10 25 40 40









$ 13,944 18 ,732 13,908 14,706 36,156 48,464
DW.
l
$ 7,000 — 7,000 15,000 15,000
C
fi
4 2 3 5 3
N
fi
40 40 20 8 3 1
Symbols: "0" means a non-working dependent spouse
"—
" means an unmarried military wage earner
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Table V
Corp G-5/Division G-l Data Interpretation
The Corp G-5 says our Military
wage earners are o.k. and
experience no hardship due to
off post living because
The Division G-l Staff says our
Military wage earnings are not
o.k., and if they do not get the
planned pay raise or more quar-
ters built they will be hurting
because
1. Average Family Income
is $ 17,592.00
Average Worker Income is
only $ 11,089.00
The percent of working
wives per family is
only 58% and,
Average per capita Income




3. The percent of wives that
work is 92% and,
4. The average breadwinner
makes $ 15,524.00
The wives percent of Income
is 38%
5. 43% of the children live
in a home where the
family income is between
$ 20,212.00 and $ 20,944.00
46% of the children live in
a home where the head of
the household makes less
than $ 10,884.00
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C. THE CASE OF ADEA
The Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA) was
activated at Ft. Lewis Washington as a Field Operating Agency
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans two
and a half years after the birth of its predecessor organiza-
tion, the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) Staff. Now six
months after the activation, COL David, the new ADEA Chief of
Staff, knew his staff organization faced many challenges in
the future as a result of this change.
Two and a half years ago the Chief of Staff of the Army
(CSA) established ADEA's predecessor organization, HTTB, (a
staff of 32 personnel), to develop concepts, doctrine, organ-
izations, technology and material requirements for a new type
of light infantry division.
During its three year existence, HTTB designed motorized
infantry forces into a High Technology Light Division (HTLD)
capable of fighting enemy armored formations in maneuver
warfare. They also began to transition 9ID into this config-
uration. The currently approved structure for the HTLD is at
Figure 4.6. Since this design is an evolutionary one, changes
are expected but only minor ones.
Even though the ADEA Organization (while known as the
HTTB Staff) had grown significantly in size as well as making
important accomplishments towards the design of the HTLD, COL
David knew that with its new designation came new challenges.
The most important being what its future was going to be. How
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was it to resolve its problems with a future perspective
based on its increased mission?
The decision to make ADEA a Field Operating Agency fol-
lowed a DA lh" process Review (IPR) of HTTB. Subsequent to
this IPR the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) , who was
believed to be in line to become the next CSA, submitted the
recommendation to the current CSA. He approved it and issued
General Orders No. 47.
As a result of the IPR two significant actions were direc-
ted to occur. The FORSCOM Commander was directed to assess
the impact of the newly activated Corp on the HTLD/9ID and
vice versa. I Corp., 9 IDs next highest headquarters, had been
activated after the ADEA (then HTTB) staff started on its
design of the HTLD Division. They had been left out of most
of the planning effort but yet they would be the support head-
quarters for 9ID/HTLD if they went to war. During the in
process Review (IPR) it became apparent that work needed to be
done in this area. The second action directed to occur was
for a manpower survey to be conducted within the ADEA Staff
Organization.
Four months after ADEA's activation and with the assess-
ment of I Corp's impact on the HTLD and the manpower survey
completed, COL David felt it was time to plot ADEA's future
course. The results of these two actions had given him a lot
to think about as did all his personal knowledge about the
organization since coming on board.
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The manpower survey report made the following comments:
"The ADEA mission is to, in an accelerated manner,
identify, evaluate and recommend to Department of Army
operational concepts, doctrine, organizations, materiel
requirements, technology, and training developments which
will improve the combat power, deployment capability, mo-
bilization, and sustainability of light infantry divisions
in the Total Army. This includes supporting the fielding
of the 9ID as the prototype, sustainable light division and
using the 9 ID as a means to upgrade the Total Army's light
infantry forces (see Fig. 4.-7 for ADEA's current structure).
"Overall factors currently affecting ADEA manpower re-
quirements include an expanded and continuing mission, the
wide breadth and scope of developmental areas addressed, a
shortage of key personnel and continued high level MACOM,
Department of Army, Department of Defense and Congressional
interest. ADEA's mission, as a Field Operating Agency of
HQDA, is expanded from that assigned to the High Technology
Test Bed (HTTB) . HTTB, the precedent organization, was
constituted with a mission of limited scope and duration
in mind, that is, to develop and field a prototype High
Technology Light Division (HTLD) within five years. The
original mission is included in an expanded mission that
causes ADEA to be more future-oriented and to address the
major impacts on the concepts, plans, programs and proced-
ures for all light divisions. ADEA, in response to the
needs of Total Army light divisions, must focus and draw
together the combat, training and materiel development
activities within TRADOC and DARCOM. Areas addressed by
ADEA include the gamut of developments for light infantry
maneuver forces, fire support, aviation, combat support and
combat service support. The wide breadth and scope of
these areas give rise to an extremely complex matrix for
direct coordination and interface which includes TRADOC
Schools and Centers, DARCOM MSCs and Laboratories, FORSCOM,
HQDA, officials of OSA, OSD and OMB and Congressional
staffers.
"This figure (Fig. 4.8) graphically depicts the numerous
agencies that are involved in the complex force development
process. There is the relationship between the materiel
support activity and the elements of DARCOM, which are invol-
ved in the materiel development process from initial require-
ment definition, to obtaining test equipment, through
permanent fielding of operational equipment.
"There is linkage with Forces Command which is involved
with transitioning of 9ID units, materiel allocations, unit
readiness for combat, and stationing. There are elements of
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the Training and Doctrine Command which are involved in
development of operational concepts, writing of doctrine,
design or organizations, and evaluation and testing of
HTLD Units. At the lower left is represented the routine
contacts with industry and military-industrial organiza-
tions that assist in their contact with industry. These
relationships are critical because their mission requires
them to make maximum use of off-the-shelf commercial
items. The center depicts use of contractors who perform
studies as well as detailed work in the Distributed Command
and Control System (DCCS) Program.
"Finally, the top shows how they are a Field Operating
Agency (FOA) of DCSOPS and work through OSD and the Congress
in order to get the authorization to purchase the major
equipment items for fielding in the division. They also
receive advice and assistance from the Army Science Board,
the Defense Science Board, Defense Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency (DARPA) , and Defense Nuclear Agency. The main
point in this chart is to show that ADEA is the catalyst at
the center, merging the efforts of the Materiel Developers
(DARCOM) , Combat Developers (TRADOC) , and Real Users
(FORSCOM) . The matrix involves ADEA managers from Program
Manager to Chief of Staff level and, along with the scope
and impact of the assigned mission, drives the general ADEA
requirement for mature people with broad, extensive military
and/or R&D backgrounds. ADEA is charged by the Chief of
Staff of the Army with finding new ways to accelerate the
Army's force development process, an area where OSD and
Congress have shown vigorous interest. Continued high level
visibility and support for ADEA programs and procedures will
be necessary to effectively and efficiently speed-up force
development efforts in the Army. ADEA is currently author-
ized only 62 percent of the personnel required for comple-
tion of its assigned mission. Most ADEA positions, e.g.,
Program Managers, Studies Officers and Concepts Officers, are
generally one deep and responsible for singularly unique sets
of products.
"Table 6 depicts HTTB/ADEA TDAs before and after the
manpower survey. Authorized enlisted personnel went from
19 to 9 personnel causing a major shortfall in areas such as
administrative and operations services. The large increase
in the number of civilian personnel was due to the exchange
of several military slots in the Test and Evaluation Division
and the Resource Management Office to civilian positions and
the authorization of new secretarial/clerical positions.
"The ADEA Force Development and Test and Evaluation pro-
cesses are highly dynamic efforts in which it has proven
difficult to forecast a specific workload very far into the
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future. This is particularly true for Force Development
Testing and Experimentation (FDTE) and Innovative Testing,
the categories of testing to which a major part of ADEA's
testing effort is devoted. FDTE and Innovative Testing
address materiel, doctrine, organizational and training
concepts which require validation by field testing. Such
concepts are often developed on short notice and require
implementation on an urgent basis to improve the combat
capability of light infantry divisions. Such tests are
often planned, conducted and reported in less than 18
months and on occasion in six months or less. Equipment
delivery schedules change, priorities of equipment issue
are revised and programs are delayed resulting in changes
in test schedules. Other evaluation techniques, such as
studies and simulations, are also subject to the same short
notice. While ADEA will provide input for the Army PPBS
cycle and be more future-oriented than HTTB, much of its
Force Development and Test and Evaluation effort will con-
tinue to be near-term and reactive in nature—success will
hinge on the development and support of ADEA
—
peculiar pro-
cedures that allow greater flexibility in executing near-
term force development activities."
The I Corp Commander and the 9 ID Commander decided that
the best way to assess the impacts of I Corp and 9ID on each
other was to have an Interface Conference between I Corp, 9 ID
and ADEA. Many issues were brought forth as a result of this
conference. The attendees to the conference included repre-
sentatives from each of Corp and Division primary staffs,
special staff officers from Division, ADEA staff and selected
personnel and commanders. The conference was planned and run
by the Corp and 9ID organizational effectiveness officers.
The purpose of the Interface Conference was to begin a struc-
tured and detailed assessment of the impact of an HTLD on a
Corps and on the installation. It was a process to allow
coordinated identification, analysis, and resolution of key
issues to occur.
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Many at the conference felt that the Division must foster
a real mid-level command interest in the Division's Readi-
ness vs its transition efforts. Everyone knew that the Divi-
sion CG was extremely interested in readiness and expected
that matters in this area would improve. They felt readiness
must be defined in relationship to the Division's transition
effort. Most commanders agreed that development of a Master
Schedule enumerating projected major field exercises and
tests would assist in the balancing act required to satisfy
readiness as well as transition's requirements. One com-
mander commented that "This is an attitudinal/mind-set issue."
Along these same lines they felt the lines of communication
between HQ I Corps, 9th ID and ADEA must be formally tail-
ored to accommodate the transition project. They pointed out
that literally every staff agency is involved in the transi-
tion problem and that relationships between I Corps, ADEA,
9 ID had not been formally developed to coordinate actions.
As an example, they cited the fact that the AR for ADEA Char-
ter was still in draft. "Conflicting mission of ADEA,
FORSCOM, I Corps and 9th ID will hinder smooth transition,"
is the way one commander had stated the issue.
The Division's Deputy Chief of Staff of Facilities and
Engineer (DFAE) pointed out that the Status of Environmental
Impact Statements and the fielding of the HTLD was an issue
yet unresolved. They stated that "the new HTLD is expected
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to have a significantly different impact on the Ft. Lewis
environment than a light division will."
Perhaps the most significant of the issues they raised
was the one indicating that there was no long-term Station-
ing Plan for Fort Lewis. The development of a workable
stationing plan is dependent upon the creation of a master
schedule of events for I Corps/9ID, the "growth plan 1 for
I Corps, and the final structure of 9 ID. Any stationing
plan developed they felt should take into consideration near,
mid and long-term considerations, such as units that are to
be activated/deactivated, and ROTC and Reserve unit require-
ments. Since a long-term stationing plan did not currently
exist, they said, "A doordinated, comprehensive schedule of
unit events superimposed on a time line must be developed
before starting work on a long term stationing plan."
Another interesting question the DFAE asked was "Is There a
need for temporary structures at Ft. Lewis to support 9ID's
transition?" He said there was a 700 series regulation that
authorizes the construction of temporary facilities, but
presently there were no programmed funds for temporary facil-
ity construction. In more specific terms they remarked that
there may not be facilities available for ROTC and Reserve
Component Support as a result of 9ID's transition efforts and
I Corps' expansion. The DAFE also said there was a "need to
identify short and long term ROTC and Reserve Component facil-
ity requirements at Ft. Lewis." The anticipated activation
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of new units on the installation such as Special Forces,
the Corps Growth Plan, and 9th ID Transition will impact
on availability of facilities. Currently there were no
funds programmed for construction of more facilities to
support ROTC/Reserve unit training.
Even in the light of the fact the ADEA had recently
become an Army Agency, the question "Will the HTLD/ADEA be
returned to the inventory of divisions available for deploy-
ment or will it remain a 'Test Bed 1 in a constant state of
flux for the foreseeable future?" was asked. To the sur-
prise of everyone, the exact answer was not known. The
feeling was that if the HTLD remains a "Test Bed", then Corps
does not need to worry about tactical employment until a
deployable division is fielded. If the HTLD was to return
to the inventory, then it was necessary to begin resolving
Corps interface issues now.
There also was a need to determine who actually manages,
controls and approves the automation of equipment and soft-
ware. The AMO was currently bypassed or "overrun" and the
interface was poor. There needed to be a detailed definition
of the Installation's deployment transportation requirements
to be added by the HTLD transition. The Division would have
to identify changes in the movement data base that will be
generated by changes in organization and equipment. Along
these same lines the Division NBC element needed to be auto-
mated along with a comparable Corps automated NBC system.
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The Division DCCS had an ADP system in NBC but there
was no comparable system within Corps' NBC. I Corp did not
know how the integration of the Distributed Command and
Control System (DCCS) into the HTLD would impact on its
tactical communication capabilities.
Nearly everyone at the conference felt that there was
no integrated schedule of events to enable staff agencies
to plan forand monitor the progress of major actions that
affect command and staff activity. Currently there existed
more than one schedule of events. For example, there was
the HTLD Transition Plan, Force Modernization Plan, FTX
Activity Plan, Facilities Plan, 5-Year Range Improvement
Plan, and the Unit Activations/Deactivations Plan. Without
an integrated schedule everything appeared as a significant
event which competed for scarce personnel, planning resour-
ces, funds and time. They concluded that in order to
maintain an integrated schedule, automation was essential.
The Corps G-3 did not know if the Corps slice of equip-
ment would be compatible or interface with HTLD equipment
such as the TACFIRE, and Engineer. He pointed out that the
HTLD needed an 8" gun for nuclear/chemical delivery. But
the equipment had not been integrated for Corps/Division
interface. Also several functions such as AG, Mess, etc.
that were normal to other Army Divisions had been stripped
out of the HTLD. But non-divisional units normally assigned
to the Corps to support a "typical" division are not
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sufficient to support a HTLD. A side issue of this was
that the HTLD was being designed to meet a particular ramp
strength rather than having certain capabilities.
From a daily training perspective the identification of
installation range facility requirements needed to be done.
As of conference date neither I Corps' or 9ID's staff had
completely defined the scope of this issue. A distinction
had to be made between ranges that are needed for force
modernization or to support the transition effort. The Comp-
troller was quick to add that the creation of new ranges
needed to be included in the PARR estimate.
The Corp Comptroller noted also that since Corp had not
been involved upfront in the HTLD planning the upcoming
fiscal year resource programs would need to be reviewed for
necessary reprogramming to accommodate previously uniden-
tified transition problems. Also, the five year fiscal
program submissions needed to avoid the shortfalls encoun-
tered in the current FY budget planning process. He also
highlighted the fact that there had been many cuts in the
numbers of organic Division support personnel. The 9ID's
transition office was currently developing appropriate
schedule "X's" to regain some of these lost positions for
the HTLD. He felt the Corp needed to force plan in order
to offset the adverse affects of CSS personnel reduction in
the 9th ID. This would require input from numerous staff
cells.
93
There also was the problem of whether I Corps needed
to reconstitute medical assets to supplement medical care
because the preventive medicine capability in HTLD was
limited. The medical structure within the Division
limited 9ID's ability to reconstitute medical assets.
The DISCOM Commander stated that the 9th HTLD does not
have assets to transport ordnance (conventional and special
ammunition) . There was a shortfall of lift/haul capability
within the division that exceeded standard light division
and 9 ID (HTLD) had a unique ammo packaging system due to
uniqueness of weapons systems. Of special concern to him
was the addressing of the GS maintenance support for IEW
equipment. The 0&0 concept for the MI Bn in the New
Division called for organizational and DS level maintenance
for the IEW equipment (sensor and jammer systems) to be
performed at the MI Bn and GS was to be done at COSCOM level.
However, for non-standard equipment, DARCOM was planning on
contractor support at all levels. His question was "How
will this concept be integrated into contingency planning?"
He also noted that supply support for locally produced non-
standard items of equipment had to be addressed. Some of
HTLD equipment was produced locally in a "Skunk Works" shop
as a means to test the idea before going for full contracting,
He felt the development of complete, comprehensive support
packages for locally created equipment/systems was essential
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if the 9th ID is going to meet its day-to-day contingency/
deployment missions.
There was even an impact on the Chaplains. They pre-
dicted they would not be able to meet their Installation
mission as a result of projected personnel losses under the
HTLD design. The Chaplain's office needs the officer/en-
listed cuts restored in order to support present and future
requirements. Currently actions were in progress to regain
the personnel cuts which had been approved at the CG's
Alderbrook II Conference.
From his own experiences COL David knew there were some
issues ADEA had to address on its own. Now that ADEA was
an Army Agency its ability to task other agencies would
increase. But many in its environment had begun to feel
the pinch of this added support to ADEA. For example,
during a recent coordination visit with the USAIS, the CG,
USAIS, commented to COL David that "USAIS support for HTLD
is coming entirely out-of-hide from an organization which
is already over-committed. " He asked that they consider
carefully any further requests for USAIS support. He also
asked for their cooperation in assisting their preparation
of a brief article for the Infantry Magazine on how USAIS
is assisting in the development of HTLD."
Then there was the growing problem of how to select the
best alternative pieces of equipment from among several
being offered by different contractors upon completion of
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tests. One of his analysts had proposed using a decision
theory technique. He had provided him with an example of
how it should work based on the results of their recent
test of three night vision devices. Contractor A had
made three different sizes: light, medium, and heavy.
Contractor B had made just one night vision device for
testing. Fig. 4.9 is a matrix which reflects the probabil-
ity of detecting a target with each of the night devices by
Contractor A (1,2,3) and Contractor B (#4). Based
on this data, and under the assumption that the full moon
will occur, the analyst said Night Device (ND) #1 should be
selected, because it has a 0.
9
probability of detecting a
target. However, based on past climatic data of the Mid
East Region (one of the potential areas of deployment for
the HTLD) it has been found that the probability that each
of the moon conditions (full moon, half moon, zero moon
illuminating) will occur is (0.4)
, (0.5) , and (0.1) respec-
tively. When these probabilities were considered, the
analyst said the 3rd ND of Contractor A was the best choice
because it has an expected return for detecting a target of
0. 69 . Contractor B*s version is worse with a value equal
to . 50 . The analyst also pointed out that if the prob-
ability of the moon conditions were unknown then Contractor
B's version would be the best because it has a value of 0.50 .
The closest ND of Contractor A, under these assumptions,
was ND #2 with an expected value of . 40 . Finally, he
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pointed out that if he looked rationally at the problem,
that is assume that each moon condition is equally likely
to occur, then the best system would be ND #3 of Contractor
A, with an expected return of . 56 .
He also felt that ADEA needed to become more concerned
about examining the implications of the maintenance results
they observed on equipment during testing. During a recent
test the "corrective maintenance task times" were observed
for the Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) . He felt they needed to
answer from data like that in Table 7 such questions as
what's the range of the data?, what's the mean task time?,
what's the mean frequency of occurrences?, and what's the
standard deviations of each also? Examining such informa-
tion as this would allow them to get involved early on in
the integrated logistic support system for these new
weapon systems.
One of the final areas COL David knew ADEA would have
to address was that of budgeting. HTTB had been budgeting,
but on a limited bases. Table No. 8 shows HTTB ' s current
budget levels. This budget was limited parly due to the fact
that HTTB was originally expected to last for only five
years, the time frame in which the CSA expected HTLD to be
designed and fielded. The ADEA needs to assess these fig-
ures and see if any reprogramming would be needed or supple-
mentals requested. He felt ADEA's expanded mission would
have some impact on what their budgeting plan should be.
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In discussing the future with his Executive Officer,
COL Davis had said,
"From now through November we will redesign HTLD.
On 1 December we will recommend to CSA our new design.
In the first half of next year we will transition and
train a Brigade slice of the HTLD to prepare for laser
strike, a Division FTX next August. In March, the year
following that, this Brigade slice will participate in
JRX Border Star at Ft. Bliss against 3d ACR. This will
be an 'external evaluation 1 of the 3D Brigade and its
slice by TRADOC . By fall of that year HQDA will make
decisions on the final organization and operational
concept of HTLD. In 3 years, 9 ID will complete its
transition to a prototype HTLD."
Probably the last unknown for ADEA, and probably more
specifically for COL David, was the fact that the 9ID had
just gotten a new CG, MG Kennedy, two weeks ago. Trying
to find out how he should address these problems with him
would be one of COL David's first concerns. He knew very
little about MG Kennedy except that he was known to take a
very analytical approach to things. This came across very
sharply during his initial inbrief by the ADEA Staff. He
repeatedly asked where could computer applications be made
in their work, and if they had attempted some of the various
management techniques such as Critical Path Methods, and
PERT. During one of their informal talks COL David had
started describing to MG Kennedy how the I Corp Commander,
the previous CG, MG Simpson, had discovered many of the
interface issues facing the Corp and Division by utilizing
the Organizational Effectiveness Staff. His reply to that
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Table VII
Corrective Maintenance Task Times and
Frequency of Occurrence for Two
Fast Attack Vehicles
FAV I FAV II
Task Time(Min) Frequency ' Task Time (Min) Frequency
41 2 37 4
39 3 25 10
47 2 35 5
35 5 31 7
23 13 13 3
27 10 11 2
33 6 15 8
17 12 29 8
19 12 21 14
35 2 25 12
17 6 19 10
12 2 21 12
15 4 23 13
37 1 29 9
27 10 13 3
33 3 9 1










DARCOM (HQ) 9.9 7.3
BASEOP & EQUIP OPS
FORSCOM (9 ID) 5.3
FIELDING
DARCOM (HQ) 2 21.0 38.5
TOTAL 42.5 28.3 38.5
1. $8.1M for Surrogate Lease;
$1.8M for Support (Total 9.9 OMA).
2. Fielding process began in FY 1 82 with reprogram
of $20.35M.
FY 1 83 reprogram action on-going; 11 systems total
$59. 5M; $49. 6M unfunded pending OSD action
(unfunded)
.
3. SPECIAL DC 31 FUNDS
D180 RDT&E $7.3M RDT&E (Same as identi-
fied above)
DNA $1.3M RDT&E (Not included in
above)
C31 Deception $1.7M RDT&E (Not included in
above)





The purpose of this chapter is to present the instruc-
tors of the various blocks of instruction with discussion
questions, a brief analysis of each question and assign-
ment questions which could be used when assigning the case
to the students for the first time.
Each case's discussion questions are presented in sepa-
rate sections of this chapter along with their respective
analysis and assignment questions.
The discussion questions and the analysis of each corre-
spond to the four major areas by which the case writer has
divided the course curriculum: systems science, how the
Army runs, management science and behavioral science.
Ideally this chapter should be the starting point for the
instructor when using either of the cases. The assignment
questions serve to give the student an initial way to think
of the case as he or she reads it for the first time. The
discussion questions are provided to give the instructor a
more specific idea how the case relates to his or her area
of instruction and should be used by each in guiding the
discussion of the case as it relates to their block. The
case writers analysis goes one step further to help the
instructor relate the case material to specific learning
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objectives within his or her block of instruction where
applicable. Finally, it is once more mentioned that the
student should assume the role of an OESO for the 9th
Infantry Division when providing a solution to the problems
in the cases. This does not eliminate the student's respon-
sibility to assess the HTTB/ADEA organization because the
9th Infantry Division Commander is also the commander of
HTTB/ADEA.
B. HTTB I TEACHING NOTES
The HTTB I case presents those issues which were associ-
ated with the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) staff from its
beginning through the first year. Some exemplary issues of
that period were lack of enough people, enormity of the
assigned mission, the leadership not fully aware of what was
required to accomplish the mission, lack of an adequate
structure to guide the staff's process [Ref. 11], and the
perception by the commanders of the 9th Infantry Division
that supporting HTTB was a distractor to their ability to
train, [Ref. 12] During the time period the HTTB staff was
basically attempting to define itself, its purpose, and how
it was to interact with its environment.
A specific note must be made in regards to Exhibit One
of this case. Exhibit One contains the actual interview
notes which the 9ID OE staff collected when it did a tran-
sition workshop for the HTTB chief of staff. [Ref. 13]
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Because these notes were lengthy, the case writer chose to
make them an exhibit. The note to be made is that this
exhibit could be removed from the case and used by the per-
sonal skills block of instruction to exercise the students
on their individual and group interview skills. Individuals
could be selected to role play the various persons who were
individually interviewed, and groups could be forced to role
play the groups. Then other students could be selected to
role play as OESOs and conduct interviews to collect the
data presented in Exhibit One. Otherwise, the notes should
be left as an exhibit to the case.
1. Discussion Questions
a. SYSTEMS SCIENCE
(1) Identify the Army units/agencies in the
staff environment?
(2) What is unique about the command relation-
ship for the commander of the HTTB?
(3) How would you apply a complex systems
model to develop a preventive strategy for systemic change
in this organization?
(4) How should the 9 ID commander's management
strategy change now that the HTTB staff has been assigned
to him?
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) Was the CSA correct in assuming that a
merger of the real user (9ID) and the developer (HTTB staff)
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would significantly reduce the acquisition time and thereby
allow this new light division to be fielded sooner?
(2) Which blocks of the Functional Life Cycle
Model the HTTB staff become involved in?
(3) In designing this new high technology
light division (HTLD) , the HTTB staff created new positions
requiring persons with new skills such as maintenance tech-
nicians at the direct support level. How would it go about
acquiring these new personnel?
C. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) Could computer systems be of help to the
HTTB staff in the management of its operation as many on
the staff think?
(2) Would CPM/PERT techniques be of any help
to the HTTB as one of the branch chiefs thinks it could?
(3) Seventeen persons out of the thirty inter-
viewed felt that a functional MIS was needed by the HTTB
staff. What would have to be some key considerations by the
staff in developing one?
(4) Are the statistical calculations made by
the G-3 and the OE staff accurate?
(5) What methods would you use in presenting
the information to the CG as an OESO?
d. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(1) Based on the interview notes, how would you
analyze the individual as a system in this organization?
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(2) How may the individual goals of members
of the HTTB staff and the 9ID conflict as each try to
accomplish their mission?
(3) What does it seem like the leadership of
the 9 ID and HTTB staff have been concerned with? What will
the new CG and HTTB chief of staff have to do differently
in order to help this organization?
2 . Analysis of Discussion Questions
a. SYSTEMS SCIENCE
(1) All of the organizations and agencies in
the HTTB staff's environment are presented throughout the
case. The key ones the student should recognize are TRADOC,
DARCOM, (and all of their subordinate agencies which are
involved in the procurement and acquisitions process) and
the civilian contracting agencies. In order to develop a
model of this organization, the student must have properly
defined the organization's environment. This teaching note
relates to terminal learning objectives (TLO) 20 and 21 in
appendix A.
(2) The unique thing about the command rela-
tionship in this organization is that the commander of HTTB
is also the commander of the 9th Infantry Division. As the
commander of the 9th Infantry Division (9ID) he reported to
the FORSCOM commander. Now that the I Corp commander has
arrived, as stated in the case's last paragraph, that would
change and he would have to report through his (I Corp
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commander) to the FORSCOM Commander. As the HTTB commander,
he was responsible for reporting through the commander of
the Combined Arms Center to the TRADOC commander. This fact
is also key to the student's development of a model of this
organization.
(3) This question seeks to get the student to
think in terms of TLO 21 as stated in appendix A. This
question should lead the student to develop a model which
will allow him or her to assist a commander of two organ-
izations who's missions, diametrically opposed by definition,
require the same personnel resources in order to be accomp-
lished.
(4) As the 9ID commander, the CG's strategy
basically revolved around being combat ready. Asking this
question should lead the student to recognize that the com-
mander must rethink his method of management in order to
accomplish the missions of both of these organizations
because his current method does not take a systems integrated
perspective of the two.
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) Requiring the student to answer this ques-
tion will cause him or her to use the knowledge gained about
how the Army's acquisition cycle works. [Ref. 14] This note
supports TL0s 5 and 7 as stated in appendix A.
(2) This question can begin to illuminate how
this organization must consider several components of the
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Functional Life Cycle Model (FICM) . In accordance with the
model it is clear that the HTTB is involved in force develop-
ment, acquisition, training requirements, distribution and
deployability as it designs this new light infantry division.
[Ref. 15] This note supports TLO 15 as stated in appendix A.
(3) This question will require the student to
examine in more detail his or her knowledge about how the
Army acquires personnel and develops programs to train them
in order to meet the requirements of newly designed units.
This note supports TLO 12 as stated in appendix A.
c. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) This question, as well as numbers 2 and 3
in this section, is aimed at getting the student to consider
the possible ways in which computers could assist the HTTB
staff in doing its job. It should cause the student to use
some of the knowledge gained during the computer litercy block
of instruction. This note supports TLO 28 as stated in
appendix A.
(2) See comments for #1 above.
(3) See comments for #1 above.
(4) The intention of this question is to get the
student to find the errors in the G-3's computations. The
basic variables such as the means, variances and standard
deviations are correct. However, the g-3 has made some errors
in his approach and conclusions about the problem. His esti-
mate that a platoon will fail 60 missions is in error because
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he has used as a value for the number of days the platoon
will spend supporting the HTTB test (X) which is clearly
outside of the range of the "X" data he used in doing his
linear regression. The student should examine whether the
sample sizes of the data the g-3 and the OE office used were
large enough in order to make any worthwhile conclusions
about the populations. It is also recommended that the
instructor have the students do a rank-sum test (also called
a Mann-Whitney or U-test) on the OE staff's survey results
and see if they can draw the same conclusions the OE staff
did as stated in the case. [Ref. 16] This note supports
TLOs 29 and 34 as stated in appendix A. The instructor can
also review part three of this section to see how the case
writer's calculations were made. [Ref. 17]
(5) This question is aimed at getting the
student to begin considering how he or she would go about
presenting this data back to the CG. This note supports
TLO 33 ad stated in appendix A.
d. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(1) The discussion of this question should
lead the student to realize how important it is to consider
the way persons within the two organizations interact. This
note supports TflLO 22 as stated in appendix A.
(2) This question should cause the student to
examine how the goals and needs of members in the organiza-
tions can potentially conflict and become the source of
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Problems. Many of the commanders in the organization did
not like to support the HTTB largely because it impacted on
one of their goals to be combat ready. This note supports
TLO 2 4 as stated in appendix A.
(3) This question is directed towards getting
the student to focus on what direction the CG and chief of
staff HTTB should go. What the leadership should do at this
time should come out of their discussion of this question.
3. Case Writer's Computations for the HTTB I Case
This section shows how the case writer made his
calculations for the two statistics problems in the HTTB I
case. Section A gives the calculations for the linear
regression and Section B gives them for the sign test,
a. LINEAR REGRESSION COMPUTATIONS









(2) The variances and standard deviations were
computed using the following equations:
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(3) In order to do the curve fit (linear
regression) on the data, and the inference about the confi-
dence interval for the mean of the distribution it was
assumed that the n random variables having the values
Y. (i-1, 2, . .
.
,n) were independently normally distributed with
2the means a + 3x. , and the common variance a . The
following determinations were made in deriving the linear
equation model:
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(4) The prediction of the number of ARTEP
missions which will be failed based on the number of days
spent supporting HTTB test (assumed in the case as 45) is
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Y = -.55 + 1.34 (x)
Y = -.55 + 1.34 (45)
Y = 59.75
b. SIGN TEST COMPUTATIONS
(1) As indicated in Table 3 of the case each
pair of data was replaced with a plus sign when the entry in
the first column was greater than the entry in the second
column, and vice versa when the first column entry was
smaller than the second column entry. This resulted in 12
plus signs and 4 minus signs.
The test was to determine whether "12
successes in 16 trials" would allow the rejection of the
null hypothesis (namely, that the true average number of
junior NCOs who feel HTTB support impacts on their ability
to train is the same as those who do not) or the alternative
hypothesis p ^ 1/2.
By using a binomial table it was found
that the probability of "12 or more successes" was
(1 - .9616) = 0.0384. It followed from this that the null
hypothesis can be rejected at the significance level a = .05,
Note
:
The case writer used the normal approxi-
mation to the binomial to compare with the above results.















Since z „,. = 1.96 and the z statistic above is equal
to 2.00, the conclusion is the same, namely there is a
difference between how the NCOs think.
4 . Assignment Questions
a. As Major Bacon what would you recommend to
the CG?
b. How would you answer the two questions the
CG asked in the case?
c. What kinds of things would you have to consider
in your plan for integrating the new Corp Headquarters?
C. HTTB II TEACHING NOTES
The HTTB II case describes what occurred in the HTTB
staff and its environment during its second year of existance.
[Ref. 18] The key events in this case around which
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discussions can be made are the CSA inprocess review, and
the activation and sudden deactivation of the Field Artil-
lery target acquisition battery. [Ref. 19] The case also
presents the student with the method the organization used
to manage the transition process. [Ref. 20]
The case reveals what the CG's management strategy was
through the many pronouncements which persons, who were a
part of the 9ID and HTTB staff, make in the case. The
comments which the assistant chief of staff for transition
and the 3rd Brigade commander made were actually implemented




(1) What organizations/units are a part of
the HTTB staff's environment?
(2) What are the command relationships for
the commander of the HTTB?
(3) How would you apply a complex systems
model to develop a preventive strategy for systemic and
integrated changes in this organization?
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) How does what the HTTB staff do with auto-
mated unit reference sheets relate to the development and
use of modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE)?
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(2) How would 9ID dispose of any excess equip-
ment which was not a part of the new HTLD's structure?
(3) How would the doctrine and literature to
support the way the HTLD would fight be developed by the
HTTB staff?
(4) How does the process of converting the 9 ID
into the new HTLD structure cut across many functional
boundaries?
(5) What would have been necessary to correct
the inadequate motor pool parking facilities of the Field
Artillery units?
(6) What reasons could explain why the officer
did not arrive in the Field Artillery unit prior to its
activation?
(7) How would the HTTB's budgeting process
interface with the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBES) phases?
C. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) How could the HTTB staff use such manage-
ment techniques as CPM/PERT to help them in controlling and
planning what a unit was ready for activation?
(2) How would you evaluate the management
structure the 9ID/HTTB organization used for managing the
transition process from a systems integration perspective?
(3) Is the UOP recommendation a good one?
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(4) Is the off-post housing cost a real problem?
Who's right—the CorpG-5-or the Division G-l?
(5) What problems did BG Harris associate with
the management structure?
b. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(1) What do you think was MG Simpson's motiva-
tion for reexamining the management structure?
(2) How does the HTTB executive officer seem
to be viewing the organization's problems?
2 . Analysis of Discussion Questions
a. SYSTEMS SCIENCE
(1) The organizations which are a part of the
HTTB's environment include all the Army agencies which are
involved in the acquisition and procurement process to
include the civilian contractor services. All organizations/
agencies in its environment are listed throughout the case.
There are special project officers assigned in the organ-
ization from other countries as such other countries are
part of its environment. This note supports TLOs 20 and 21
as stated in appendix A.
(2) This question is aimed at getting the
student to recognize that the commander of the HTTB staff
is also the commander of the 9ID. It is further aimed at
causing him or her to realize that as a dual hatted commander
he has two separate chains of command to report through. As
the commander of the HTTB staff, he reports through the
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commander of the Combined Arms Center to the commander of
TRADOC. As the 9 ID commander, he reported through the
recently included I Corp commander to the FORSCOM commander.
The student must recognize this if he or she is to develop
a realistic model of the organization. The student needs
to see that as an OESO for the 9 ID one could not solve either
of these organizations 1 problems separately.
(3) This question is intended to get the stu-
dent to start strategically discussing these two organiza-
tions. The model the student develops should allow them
to prescribe what this organization's long range strategic
management planning ought to be like. The creation of the
project manager's position should give the student the first
indication of the matrix nature of the HTTB organization.
Figure 5.1 shows this matrix relationship between the pro-
gram manager and the many agencies and organizations he
coordinated with in order to design the particular unit in
the HTLD which he was responsible for. If the student does
not get this from reading the case, the case writer recom-
mends that the instructor provide him or her with this
information. This note supports TLO 21 as stated on appen-
dix A.
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) This question is presented to increase the
students discussion of the Army's TOE and MTOE concepts as
stated in TLOs 3 and 6 in appendix A.
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(2) This question is presented to get the
student to discuss how surrogate equipment fits into the
Army's procurement and acquisition process. It supports
TLO 13 as stated in appendix A.
(3) As well as designing this new HTLD, the
HTTB staff was also responsible for evaluating the poten-
tial effectiveness of these units. This required the
development of "how to fight doctrine and manuals." Having
to answer this question will cause him or her to further
discuss what is presented in TLO 6. The Air Land Battle
was a key concept in the development of these manuals.
(4) This question aims at getting the student
to discuss how the systems integration perspective is
important when solving this organization's problems. How
this transitioning process crossed over many boundaries is
explained by the assistant chief of staff for transition in
the case.
(5) This question is given to allow more dis-
cussion on how the Army's military construction program
works for a divisional unit.
(6) This question will allow for more dis-
cussion of how the Army acquires and prepares personnel to
fill spaces generated during the force structure process.
This note supports TLO 12 as stated in appendix A .
(7) The HTTB staff had to submit its first




















































































Discussions of this question should amplify the lesson
materials in TLO 2.
c. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) This question is aimed at getting the
student to discuss the possible ways which the HTTB staff
could make use of CPM to control the multitude of actions
which required completion prior to a unit being ready for
deactivation from its current 9ID configuration and acti-
vation into its new HTLD structure. The HTTB staff did
have some staff elements which used CPM as a method to
control the many actions which were associated with transi-
tioning the 9ID units. This note supports TLO 28 as stated
in appendix A .
(2) The case explains the structure the CG
established in order to manage the transition process. Having
the student discuss this question will allow him or her to
see the interrelatedness of the problems.
(3) This question is designed to get the stu-
dent to evaluate the UOP recommendation as stated in the
case from a systems integration perspective.
(4) This question is aimed at getting the
student to do some number crunching for the statistics block
of instruction. The problem in the case is intended to
illustrate how statistical techniques can be employed on the
same set of data and yet render two totally opposite sets of
conclusions. [Ref. 22] This question should allow for a
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discussion on how to interpret the conclusions others draw
from data. The instructor can refer to part three of this
section to see how the case writer did his calculations.
[Ref. 23]
(5) The problems with the organization's
management structure, as defined by the Assistant Division
Commander, were structural inefficiencies, planning, control
and staffing.
d. BEHAVIORIAL SCIENCES
(1) This question is designed to allow the
student to discuss the leadership in the organizations
using some of the knowledge he or she has learned about
individual and organizational behaviors.
(2) This question is asked to see if the stu-
dent will recognize that the executive officer was the only
one who mentioned some of the HTTB organization's strengths.
It is also asked to get the student (future OESO) to recog-
nize that he or she must examine the organization to see if
it has any strengths which, if exploited, could help the
organization.
(3) This question is asked in order to generate
some discussion about how the OESO should go about deciding
how to do an assessment. This note supports TLO 33 as
stated in appendix A .
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3. Case Writer's Computations for the HTTB II CASE
This section contains the case writer's computations
for the statistical problem in the HTTB II case. The def-
inition of subscripts and variables are presented first.
MW.' Military Wage Earner
DW. Dependent Wage Earner
Ce . Number of children in each familyf 1 J
N f . Total number of families by Family type
F. Family type,
a. AVERAGE FAMILY INCOME
12
I (MW. , + DW. )Nf
.




b. AVERAGE WORKER INCOME
12




c. % OF WIVES THAT WORK
Working Wives
Total # of Wives
= 129/140 = 92%
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d. AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOME
12





e. % FAMILIES WITH WORKING WIVES
= # of Families with Working Wives
Total Families
129/220 = 58%























i^i = 15/32 = 46%
j . % OF CHILDREN WHOSE FAMILY INCOME IS BETWEEN
$20,212.00 and $20,994.00
7





a. As Major Bacon what problems would you brief
the CG about?
b. What courses of action would you recommend?
DV ADEA TEACHING NOTES
The ADEA case describes what occurred in the High Tech-
nology Test Bed organization during its third year of exis-
tence. It was at the end of the third year that this case
was written. The most significant event to occur during this
time was the activation of the organization as a field oper-
ating agency of the Army (FOA) and the change of its name.
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The interface conference mentioned in the case actually
occurred* [Ref . 26] The issues enumerated by the numerous
characters in the case were real. [Ref. 27] The case writer
has attempted to show how these problems crossed over many
boundaries through using the titles of the different persons
rather than the names of the characters.
1. Discussion Questions
a. SYSTEMS SCIENCE
(1) What are the command relationships for the
ADEA commander in the case?
(2) How would you apply a complex systems
model to develop a preventive strategy for systemic change
and future planning in the 9ID/ADEA organization?
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) How could I Corp/9 ID/ADEA go about solving
their stationing problem?
(2) Understanding that I Corp was responsible
for installation and facilities at Fort Lewis, how would
funding have to be done in order to support their stationing
plan?
(3) Why would new range construction have to
be included in the PARR?
(4) How could reprogramming assist I Corp in
obtaining additional funding for their fiscal resource pro-
gress in order to accommodate the unanticipated transition
problems?
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(5) How could ADEA become more involved in
the integrated logistic support process early on?
C. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) Do you think the interface conference was
a good management technique by which to address the problems
between 9 ID, I Corp, and ADEA?
(2) In what ways do 9 ID envision using com-
puters and automation for which I Corp is not prepared to
support?
(3) Could a management information system be
used by the three organizations? If so, how would it be
established?
(4) Are the computations made by ADEA's ana-
lyst correct, and would the technique he recommends be a
good one for the ADEA organization to use?
d. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(1) How would you as a newly assigned OESO to
the 9 ID approach your duties given the new CG's last comment
in the case?
(2) What effect might the CG's statement have
on other individuals and groups of individuals in the divi-
sion and ADEA staff?
2 . Analysis of Discussion Questions
a. SYSTEMS SCIENCE
(1) The purpose of this question is to get the
student to see how significantly the command relationships
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for dual hatted 9ID/ADEA commander have changed now that
ADEA has become a field operating agency of the Army. As
the ADEA commander he now reports directly to the Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(ODCSOPS) . This is different from when the organization
was designated as the HTTB. At that time, he reported
through the Combined Arms Center and TRADOC commanders to
the OSCSOPS. As the commander of 9ID the command relation-
ships remain the same. He still reports through the I Corp
commander to the FORSCOM commander which in turn reports to
DA. An interesting observation along these lines is that,
as the ADEA commander, the 9 ID commander can report directly
to the CSA as can his boss the FORSCOM commander.
(2) The purpose of this question is to get the
student to think of the organization as a system and to
explain how he or she would model the organization using
some of the knowledge gained from TLO 21 as stated in
appendix A .
b. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
(1) The purpose of this question is to rein-
force TLO 15. Specifically, it should also allow for more
discussion of how the Army's Military Construction Plan
relates to a Corp and Divisional unit. This note also sup-
ports TLO 4 as stated in appendix A .
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(2) This question basically relates to the
one above. It is also intended to allow for discussion of
how the Army's Construction Plan relates to the Army's
Program, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES)
.
This note supports TLO 4 as state in appendix A .
(3) This question is asked in order to foster
more discussion of how divisional units' input get into the
Army's PPBES process. This note relates to TLO 2 as stated
in appendix A .
(4) The purpose of this question is to allow
for discussion of how the 9ID can interface with the PPBES
system in order to get more funds.
(5) The purpose of this question is to allow
for more discussion on the Army's integrated logistic sys-
tem and how it relates to the procurement process and force
development structure. This note relates to TLO's 9 and 10
as stated in appendix A .
c. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(1) The purpose of this question is to allow
for a discussion of what management techniques are good
for problem solving and decision making in this organization.
(2) Because I Corp had not been included in
the designing of the HTLD, it was not prepared to support
the many ways in which automation and computers were to be
used in the HTLD structure. The NBC problem in the case is
a good example of the kinds of problems it faced in this area,
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The purpose of this question is to allow for more discussion
on how computers and automation could help these organiza-
tions solve this problem.
(3) This question will allow for more discus-
sions on how, in particular, a MIS may help the communica-
tions between these three organizations. How such a system
could be established may also be discussed. This note sup-
ports TLO 1 as stated in appendix A .
(4) The purpose of this question is to get the
student to validate the statistical calculations. It also
allows for more discussion of the concepts of probability.
This note supports TLOs 29 and 31 as listed in appendix A.
The instructor is also referred to section three for the
case writer's calculations. [Ref. 28]
c. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(1) The purpose of this question is to allow
for more discussion on how individual behaviors can impact
on an organization. This could also lead to a discussion
of how the OESO will have to be ready to deal with commanders
whose value systems may be the same as that expressed by the
commander in the case. The last comment in the case by the
CG was supposedly a true statement. At the time the case
was written there was no one assigned as the OESO to the
division. The two that were there had gone to units within
the division and the OE NCO had been made a part of the EEO
office. The amount of OE work he did was very minimal and
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none for the CG. This note supports TLOs 22 and 2 3 as
stated in appendix A .
(2) The purpose of this question is to get
the student to discuss what effect the CG's preception of
being his own OE would have on others in the division or
ADEA. This note relates to TLo 24 as stated in appendix A.
3. Case Writer's Computations for the ADEA Case
This section contains the case writer's computa-
tions for the decision theory problems in the ADEA case. The
comments made by the analyst were based on calculations for
decisions under certainty, risk, uncertainty as a pessimist,
and as a rationalist. The comments are presented in this
section in the same order in which they are stated in the
case for cross reference. For easy reference, the matrix of






























a. DECISION UNDER CERTAINTV
Under the conditions that type of moonlight 1
(full moon) will exist with certainty, the best pay off
(night device giving the best results) is night device one
with a probability of 0.90.
b. DECISION UNDER RISK
This calculation was based on the given prob-
abilities for the occurrence of each of the types of moon-
light. As such, it is called a decision under risk. To
determine the night device which gives the best results, the
expected return E(R) of each of the night devices (ND) over
all the types of moonlight were computed as follows:
E(R) = (0.9) (0.4) + (0.4)(0.5) + (0.1)(0.1) = 0.57
E(R) = (0.7) (0.4) + (0.5)(0.5) + (0.4)(0.1) = 0.57
E(R) = (0*8) (0.4) + (0.7) (0.5) + (0.2) (0.1) = 0.69
E(R) = (0.5)(0.4) + (0.5)(0.5) + (0.5)(0.1) + 0.50
As these calculations show, the night device with the greatest
return is night device 3 of Contractor A.
c. DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Here the assumption followed is that the prob-
ability of the type of moonlight which will occur is not
known. Hence, the decision to be made is one under uncer-
tainty. The second assumption is that no matter which device
I select, the hand (type of moonlight) nature deals me will
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be the worse. With this assumption I am in essence taking
the position of a pessimist.
In order to find the best night device under
these assumptions, the strategy is to determine for each
night device it's minimum value and then select from these
the maximum value. Applying this to the matrix in the case
you get the following results:
the worst value for ND 1 = 0.1
the worst value for ND 2 = 0.4
the worst value for ND 3 = 0.2
the worst value for ND 4 = 0.5
As a pessimist then I would choose the best of these worst
values which is 0.5 for ND 4 .
d. DECISION AS A RATIONALIST
Using this method it is assumed that the hand
nature will deal me is equally likely to occur. This
assumption allows me to assign equally likely probabilities
to each of the types of moonlight. Applying this to the
matrix of data in the case you get the following results:
E(R) = (1/3) (0.9) + (1/3) (0.4) + (1/3) (0.1) = 0.446
E(R) = (1/3) (0.7) + (1/3) (0.5) + (1/3) (0.4) = 0.533
E(R) = (1/3) (0.8) + (1/3) (0.7) + (1/3) (0.2) = 0.566
E(R) = (1/3) (0.5) + (1/3) (0.5) + (1/3) (0.5) = 0.500
The night device with the highest expected return is number
3 from Contractor A.
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4 . Assignment Questions
a. What are the key problems facing I Corp, 9ID
and ADEA?
b. How would you as a newly assigned OESO to 9ID
respond to CG * s last comment in the case?
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The cases developed in this thesis are intended to be
used as a part of the Organizational Effectiveness Course
and School's curriculum starting in July 1984.
The set of cases will contribute to the curriculum in
the following manner:
1. It will for the first time provide a structure
by which all the individual blocks of instruction can be
integrated and discussed from the perspective of one mili-
tary organization.
2. It will serve as the common reference point from
which instructors may illustrate terminal learning objec-
tives of their blocks.
3. It will be the only vehicle by which the student,
as a potential OESO, can make a "conjoint" practical
"application of the Behavioral, Management and Systems
Sciences" in order to learn how to assist the commander in
finding solutions to problems he faces.
4. It will provide the curriculum with a case study
based on an organization (Army Development and Employment
Agency) which illustrates the kinds of issues and problems
the Army commands are and will be facing in the future—for





The following terminal Learning Objectives (TLO) were
taken from the current OE School curriculum. The TLOs are
presented by sections corresponding to the following major
subject areas: How the Army Runs, Systems Science, Behavior
Science, and Management Science (to which the two key sub-
areas of computer literacy and probability/statistics belong)
Only the "tasks" are listed. The instructor can easily
cross reference each task with its appropriate "conditions"
and "standards" using the course's Syllabus of terminal
learning objectives.
A. HOW THE ARMY RUNS
1. Explain the management of the Army computer-based
management information systems.
2. Identify and define the Department of Defense and
Department of the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution System (PPBES) phases and key documents.
3. Explain the BOIP, QQPRI, and TOE development process.
4. Explain the Structure and Compositions System (SACS)
that produces the following: Logistics and Composition Sys-
tem (LOGSACS) input, Personnel Structure and Composition
System (PERSACS) input, and the Army Stationing Plan (ASIP)
.
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5. Explain the purpose of test and evaluation in the
material acquisition process.
6. Explain the Army Authorization and Document System
(TAADS) , the Vertical Army Authorization and Documentation
System (VTAADS) , the Force Accounting System, and the devel-
opment and use of Modified Tables of Organization and Equip-
ment (MTOE) , and Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA)
.
7. Describe the key terms in the acquisition of material
process.
8. Explain the procedures and documents which lead to
requirements determination in material acquisition.
9. Explain Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)
.
10. Explain the Department of Army Force Development/
Force structure process and the techniques and systems that
support this process.
11. Explain the Total Army Equipment Distribution Program,
12. Explain and discuss how personnel are acquired and
prepared to fill the spaces generated during the force
structure process.
13. Explain how the Army and Federal Government dispose
of property.
14. Explain the Force Modernization Training Concept.




16. Describe the Army as an organization and the
structure and the functions of the Army Staff.
17. Explain the Army Senior Management System.
18. Explain the organization and mission, and functions
of the installation staff.




20. Application of basic systems models to the diagnosis
and prescription of organization's current and desired states
21. Apply a complex system model to develop a preven-
tive strategy for systemic change.
C. BEHAVIOR SCIENCE
22. Analyze the individual as a system.
23. Analyze how an individual processes information.
24. Analyze group dynamics.
25. Describe and differentiate classical organization
theory and design from modern organization theory and design.
26. Demonstrate knowledge of the fundamental subject
areas of Organizational Behavior.
D. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
27. Define Decision Support Systems (DSS)
.
28. Evaluate the use of the Decision Support Systems
in a complex organization.
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29. Apply the concepts of probability.
30. Apply nonparametric graphic procedures and data
sets to illustrate features of variables and relations
among them.
31. Perform trade-off analysis involving alternative
choices, objectives, future benefits, and uncertain out-
comes.
32. Explain the concept of microcomputer networking
as it relates to the subject of Distributed Data Processing,
33. Apply basic methods to collect data.
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